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Abstract 
 Prior studies of drone strikes have focused almost exclusively on how leadership 
decapitations and targeted killings impact subsequent terrorist violence. This study aims to 
address this gap in the literature by analyzing failed drone strikes and strikes against low-level 
militants to determine how these kinds of drone strikes influence terrorist attacks against 
civilians. This study anticipates that U.S. drone strikes destabilize terrorist organizations, causing 
them to resort to civilian victimization as a means of achieving their group goals. To determine 
the validity of this hypothesis, this study examines how U.S. drone strikes affect the Tehrik-i 
Taliban (TTP), one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in Northwestern Pakistan. 
 Quantitative findings show that as the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted against the 
TTP over the prior 30 days increases, the number of civilians killed in daily TTP attacks also 
tends to increase. However, the analysis also finds that non-U.S. military operations conducted 
on the ground are a better predictor of civilian deaths than either U.S. or non-U.S. airstrikes. The 
case study of the TTP demonstrates that TTP attacks increased in frequency and lethality and 
diversified in the targets selected and geographic area covered during periods of intense drone 
strikes, suggesting that drone strikes may have a role in increasing terrorist capacity to plan and 
conduct attacks. Furthermore, drone strikes appear to encourage TTP attacks against various 
civilian targets, including: civilians whom the TTP suspect of being spies, Pakistani political 
targets, and Western interests.  
 Including failed drone strikes and strikes against low-level militants when analyzing the 
effects of drone strikes on terrorist violence is critical to evaluating the effectiveness of the U.S. 
drone campaign as a whole. This study aims to contribute to this field of research by examining 
how the entirety of the U.S. drone program alters TTP patterns of violence against civilians in 
Pakistan. 
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A primary component of U.S. counter-terrorism policy and arguably a central technology 
in the future of warfare, drone strikes are increasingly the preferred method for eliminating 
terrorist threats. The United States has conducted almost 20,000 drone strikes across the Middle 
East and North Africa, and the Biden administration continues to rely on drones in the so-called 
“War on Terror,” conducting a confirmed strike as recently as January 29, 2021, in Somalia.1 
However, despite the United States’ heavy reliance on drones, there is a significant lack of 
studies examining how the entirety of the U.S. drone campaign impacts terrorist organizations. 
Previous literature tends to focus on strikes that eliminate a terrorist leader without considering 
the effects of strikes that either fail to eliminate their target or that only kill low-level terrorist 
organization members. Without accounting for the effects of these general drone strikes, 
policymakers cannot accurately determine the drone campaign's effectiveness as a whole.  
To begin examining how the entirety of the U.S. drone campaign impacts terrorist 
organizations, I am analyzing whether U.S. drone strikes against the Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) are 
associated with increased TTP attacks against civilians and how U.S. drone strikes influence the 
ways in which the TTP plan and execute these attacks. The TTP are a terrorist organization 
based in Pakistan’s northern tribal regions, in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)2 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces, and they represent one of the main targets of the 
U.S. drone campaign. To determine whether U.S. drone strikes against the TTP are associated 
with increased TTP attacks against civilians, I am conducting a series of simple linear regression 
 
1 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, and Melissa Salyk-Virk, “America’s Counterterrorism Wars,” New America, 
accessed February 27, 2021, http://newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/. 
2 FATA was merged with the KPK province in 2018; however, I will continue to reference the region as FATA. 
Previous research differentiates the regions, and the majority of scholars continue to refer to the two provinces 
separately even after the merger.  
and multiple linear regression tests which test the strength of the relationship between airstrikes 
and TTP violence as well as the strength of the relationship between ground strikes and TTP 
violence. These tests include all U.S. and non-U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, which allows me to 
evaluate whether an increase in general airstrikes is associated with increased TTP attacks 
against civilians. My hypothesis is that increases in drone strikes correlate to increases in civilian 
deaths from TTP attacks. I predict that these strikes destabilize terrorist organizations, making 
the terrorist group more likely to indiscriminately attack civilians and forcing them to engage in 
attacks to coerce government institutions to halt drone strikes. After testing this hypothesis in the 
linear regression models, I will use the TTP as a case study to examine the quantitative analysis 
results and further investigate how and why drone strikes influence terrorist violence. 
The use of drones to target military leaders emerged primarily after 9/11 during the 
subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.3 In the early stages of the American invasion, the 
military deployed drones for target identification purposes, although the CIA rapidly turned to 
drones to assassinate suspected Al-Qaeda members.4 The CIA further expanded the program the 
following year, targeting a mujahedeen base in February 2002 and widening the campaign into 
Yemen, where they targeted Salim Sinan al-Harethi, an Al-Qaeda member.5 The attack killed al-
Harethi and set a major precedent for expansion that would characterize the program's future. 
What followed Yemen was a massive campaign against Taliban members who had fled across 
the Durand Line, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and taken refuge in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). The CIA conducted its first drone strike in the 
 
3 James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to 
Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan” (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic of 
Stanford Law School (Stanford Clinic) and the Global Justice Clinic at New York University School of Law (NYU 
Clinic), 2012), 8, https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_SIM260090013. 
4 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey, 8. 
5 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey, 10; Rebecca Gordon, American Nuremberg: The U.S. Officials Who Should 
Stand Trial for Post-9/11 War Crimes (Hot Books, 2016), 167. 
Waziristan province of FATA in June 2004, targeting Taliban leader Nek Muhammad.6 Drone 
strikes continued to increase in the region during the following years: by 2012, the United States 
was conducting a strike every six days, and under the Obama administration, drone strikes had 
increased by a factor of nine compared to under the Bush administration.7   
These strikes in Pakistan target multiple groups, including Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani, and 
the Taliban. This study specifically focuses on the TTP, which is the umbrella organization for 
various branches of the Taliban operating within Pakistan.8 The group has close ties to both the 
Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and it is considered the largest and deadliest terrorist group in 
Pakistan.9 Based in South Waziristan, their main goals are “to enforce Shariah law in Pakistan; to 
establish a unified front to combat U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan; and to conduct 
‘defensive jihad’ against Pakistani security forces.”10 Baitullah Mehsud was the first leader of the 
TTP, establishing the Mehsud faction as the most powerful faction of the TTP.11 Following his 
death in 2009, the group was led by Hakimullah Mehsud, then Maulana Fazlullah, and as of 
2020, is headed by Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.12 Like other terrorist groups, the TTP frequently 
attack “soft” targets such as schools, businesses, and homes. The group is perhaps most 
notorious for the attack that injured schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai in 2012.13  
Despite the commonalities between various violent groups like the TTP, the term 
“terrorism” has proven challenging to define. The academic community has yet to reach a 
 
6 Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey, Living Under Drones, 11. 
7 Jeremey Scahill, “Find, Fix, Finish,” The Intercept, October 2015, https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/find-fix-
finish/; Gordon, American Nuremberg, 164. 
8 Stanford University, “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” Mapping Militant Organizations, July 2018, 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan. 
9 Stanford University. 
10 Stanford University. 
11 Stanford University. 
12 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan.” 
13 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan.” 
consensus on what constitutes terrorism, with disagreements arising over what goals qualify an 
act as terrorism, who the actor must be, and what they should be targeting; lines become 
especially blurred between the designations of “insurgents,” “rebels,” and “terrorists.” This paper 
will refer to the TTP and other groups typically considered terrorist organizations, such as Al-
Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, as terrorists, and maintain the same classification used by 
previous researchers when referencing their works. 
It is also important to clarify that targeted killings, leadership decapitations, and drone 
strikes do not always describe the same event. Targeted killings may refer to the assassination of 
any identified target, whereas leadership decapitation necessarily refers to the elimination of a 
specific leader within an organization. Drone strikes are one of several methods for achieving 
either of these aims, though they are often intended for the latter. 
This paper aims to address the relatively unstudied question of how drone strikes against 
low-level militants affect terrorist groups, and more specifically, it asks how these strikes affect 
terrorist violence. U.S. drone strikes fall into one of two categories: personality or signature 
strikes. Personality strikes refer to strikes against named targets; most prior studies of drone 
strikes focus on these kinds of drone strikes. In contrast, signature strikes are those strikes with 
unnamed targets, often simply “militants,” that aim to kill people whom drone operators have 
identified as exhibiting terrorist behavior and presumably are a threat to the United States. Rather 
than exclude signature strikes from my analysis and focus on the effects of personality strikes, I 
have included both types of drone strikes in my dataset, thereby allowing me to begin evaluating 
how the entirety of the U.S. drone campaign influences terrorist violence. 
In order to address this question of how drone strikes against low-level militants affect 
terrorist groups, I will conduct a series of simple linear regression and multiple linear regression 
tests using the Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED is a non-
profit organization that collects data on political violence and protests around the world. The 
quantitative analysis will use events of TTP violence against civilians and state or external action 
against the TTP to identify whether there is a relationship between the number of U.S. airstrikes 
conducted and subsequent TTP violence against civilians.  
Because the quantitative analysis is a correlation study, it only reveals whether terrorist 
violence increases in the wake of a drone strike; it does not explain why or how. For this reason, 
this paper includes a case study of the TTP that aims to examine possible explanations for the 
trends observed in the quantitative analysis, such as how drone strikes influence target selection, 
attack type, and terrorist organizational structure. I will use security reports, news reports of TTP 
violence, interviews with victims, and TTP propaganda to provide possible explanations for the 
results identified in the quantitative analysis. 
           This paper seeks to fill a gap in policymakers’ understanding of the effectiveness of the 
drone campaign: how effective is the entire U.S. drone campaign, including strikes against low-
level militants, at degrading terrorist organizations. Prior research suggests that even strikes 
which successfully eliminate their intended target fail to collapse terrorist organizations.14 Not 
only that, the effectiveness of the strike in destabilizing terrorist organizations is predominantly 
dependent upon the size, type, and age of the organization.15  Furthermore, most of the literature 
on drone strikes focuses on how strikes against a terrorist leader affect terrorist groups, failing to 
consider how strikes against low-level militants or signature strikes against unnamed militants 
influence terrorist activities. From a policy perspective, this omission is especially concerning 
 
14 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” 
International Security 38, no. 4 (April 2014): 7–38, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00157. 
15 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, 
no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 719–55, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068. 
considering the high rate at which drone strikes miss their intended targets: according to leaked 
documents detailing a drone operation in Northwestern Pakistan in 2012-2013, less than 20% of 
those killed by drone strikes were the intended target.16 Therefore, understanding how the U.S. 
drone campaign as a whole is affecting terrorist groups is critical to evaluating the effectiveness 
of drone strikes as a counter-terrorism policy. To the extent that the existing literature deals with 
strikes that do not eliminate a specific target, it does so from a humanitarian perspective, 
assessing how these strikes affect civilian populations and ignoring how they might alter terrorist 
targeting patterns and further endanger civilian lives. 
The first part of this paper will review the existing literature on the observed relationships 
between drone strikes and terrorism, focusing on relevant studies of civilian victimization, 
targeted killings and leadership decapitations, and drone strike effectiveness. The second part 
will evaluate whether there is a correlation between U.S. airstrikes and TTP violence. The third 
part will provide a case study of the TTP that uses news reports of TTP attacks, interviews with 
locals and victims, and TTP statements and propaganda to explain how the TTP respond to 
changes in drone strike frequency. The fourth part of the paper will synthesize the findings of 
both the quantitative analysis and the case study to offer potential explanations for the results of 
the quantitative and qualitative studies. Finally, the fifth part of the paper will consider future 






16 “Operation Haymaker Effects,” Classified Pentagon Study Presentation, The Intercept, 
https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/15/operation-haymaker/.   
II. Literature Review 
This section of the paper will analyze studies on civilian victimization, targeted killings 
and leadership decapitations, and drone strikes. Although a large body of research examines 
civilian victimization in general, analyzing specific studies of terrorist and insurgent violence 
against civilians provides the necessary context for understanding the potential reasons behind 
the TTP's violence. Surveying early research on targeted killings and leadership decapitations is 
also useful because its findings can be applied to drone strikes. Since drones are a relatively new 
technology, only the most recent literature directly addresses them as a specified method of 
killing and examines how they affect terrorist groups. 
The surveyed literature divides into five categories: terrorist retaliation, combatant 
capacity, group characteristics, the principal-agent problem, and strike effectiveness.  
 
Retaliation 
A key question in terrorism studies is whether or not terrorist groups retaliate after 
targeted killings. Early findings suggest that targeted killings have positive vengeance effects, 
meaning that targeted killings cause an increase in vengeance killings. However, later studies 
find that the increase in terrorist attacks following targeted killings may be due to other factors, 
such as organizational changes.17 In his 2006 study “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” Byman 
argues that terrorist groups retaliate when their leaders are killed, citing examples from the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict. In July 2002, Israeli Defense Forces bombed the apartment of Hamas 
leader Salah Shaheda, provoking Hamas into declaring it would fight until “Jews see their own 
 
17 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 95, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20031914; Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, “Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted 
Killings on Militant Group Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 830–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671. 
body parts in every restaurant, every park, every bus, and every street.”18 The threat held weight 
since Hamas had killed 48 Israeli citizens several years earlier in response to the IDF's 
assassination of Hamas operative Yahya Ayyash.19 However, when Abrahms and Mierau also 
examine targeted killings in the Israel-West Bank-Gaza Strip theater, they find little support for 
Byman's “vengeance theory.” They attribute the uptick in violence occurring post-targeted 
killing to organizational change rather than a desire for revenge.20 This organizational change 
occurs as lower-level members within the terrorist organization are emboldened to act without 
the discipline enforced by higher-level leaders. However, a study conducted in 2018 by Jaeger 
and Siddique focusing on drone strikes against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda did find some support 
for the vengeance theory: they observed vengeance effects on terrorist groups in Pakistan, noting 
that the effects vary across factions. According to the study, an attack by the Mehsud faction of 
the TTP is 12.7% more likely 11 days after a drone strike in South Waziristan, but this likelihood 
decreases after 14 days with 0.119 fewer terrorist attacks two weeks after a drone strike occurs.21 
Therefore, Jaeger and Siddiqu emphasize that the incapacitation effects from drone strikes are 
stronger than the observed vengeance effects.22  
 
Combatant Capacity 
The literature on civilian victimization examines violence against non-combatants in 
conflict—for example, the TTP attack on schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai. For this study, the 
 
18 Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” 96. 
19 Byman, 98. 
20 Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, “Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group 
Tactics,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 5 (September 3, 2017): 12, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671. 
21 David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, “Are Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics 
of Violence between the United States and the Taliban,” CESifo Economic Studies 64, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 
690, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ify011. 
22 Jaeger and Siddique, 690. 
essential subfield within studies of attacks on civilians is terrorist combatant capacity because 
this relationship between combatant and opponent affects the combatant's decision to target 
civilians.23 Reed Wood has authored much of the scholarship on this issue; his arguments that 
weaker groups are more likely to inflict violence against civilians, whereas stronger groups are 
less likely to, are foundational to the field of civilian victimization. Wood argues that weak 
groups are motivated to target civilians because they do not possess the ability to provide 
benefits to and demand loyalty from their members; in contrast, strong groups can provide 
incentives to encourage civilian support.24 Together with Jacob Kathman and Stephen Gent, 
Wood further maintains that as a group continues to weaken relative to its opponent, it becomes 
increasingly likely to target civilians because it prefers “immediate goals, such as the acquisition 
of resources, stemming losses, and preventing group collapse.”25 In other words, weak groups 
are forced to rely more on violence and fear to extract resources from the population, and are, 
therefore, more likely than stronger groups to target civilians following significant battlefield 
losses.26   
 
Group Characteristics 
One of the most significant findings in the literature on leadership decapitations was the 
discovery of the relationship between the effectiveness of leadership decapitations and internal 
group structure. In 2009, Jenna Jordan, who has since published several significant studies 
 
23 Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 
(September 1, 2010): 601–14, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310376473. 
24 Wood, 601. 
25 Reed M. Wood, Jacob D Kathman, and Stephen E Gent, “Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in 
Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 5 (September 2012): 657, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312449032. 
26 Reed M. Wood, “From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence,” International 
Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 979–99, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000204. 
related to this topic, identified an existing relationship between certain group characteristics and 
decapitation effectiveness, looking at group age, organization type, and size. First, she found that 
decapitation is most often successful against young organizations.27 Second, decapitation is 
detrimental to destabilization efforts against ideological, separatist, and religious groups.28 
However, it is more effective against ideological groups than against religious and separatist 
groups.29 Third, decapitation may be productive against small groups, but it is counterproductive 
against larger groups.30 Significantly, her study means that leadership targeting is 
counterproductive against older, larger, religious terrorist organizations—a description that 
characterizes many of the groups which the United States focuses on in its counterterrorism 
efforts.31 However, when Patrick Johnston examined the effects of removing insurgency leaders 
during counterinsurgency efforts, he disagreed with Jordan's conclusions, stating that they were 
“premature,” as he finds the opposite of her results to be true of an insurgency's age. He argues 
that leadership decapitations impact insurgencies engaged in long campaigns more than those 
engaged in short campaigns because “leadership decapitation can help break the morale of 
insurgencies that have been engaged in long, often difficult, campaigns.”32   
In addition to the traits identified by Jordan, the literature also examines the 
organizational aspects of terrorist groups. Byman recognizes early on that targeted killing is less 
effective against decentralized groups, noting that many Palestinian terrorist groups have adapted 
to leadership targeting by providing operatives with greater control over attacks, thus making 
 
27 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, 
no. 4 (December 2, 2009): 742, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068. 
28 Jordan, 742. 
29 Jordan, 742. 
30 Jordan, 743. 
31 Jordan, 723. 
32 Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in 
Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36, no. 4 (April 2012): 73, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076. 
true leadership decapitation impossible.33 In her 2014 study “Attacking the Leader, Missing the 
Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” Jordan also acknowledges the 
importance of group layout to decapitation success; her study examines the effects of 
bureaucratization and communal support on a group's resiliency to leadership decapitation, using 
group age and size as a proxy for bureaucracy and group type as a proxy for communal 
support.34 The results of her 2014 study support her earlier conclusions that older, larger, 
religious organizations are more likely to resist destabilization after a leadership decapitation 
because they have become bureaucratized over time, enabling them to replace leaders easily. 
These types of organizations also usually possess more local support than other organization 
types.35 In contrast, younger, smaller, ideological organizations are more likely to become 
destabilized following a leadership decapitation because they have not yet had the time to 
develop bureaucratic traits, nor do they often have the same communal loyalty as the groups 
mentioned previously.36 When applied to Al-Qaeda, Jordan finds that leadership decapitations 
were, therefore, unlikely to destabilize the group and had the potential to embolden their younger 
affiliates.37 Later studies support this finding: one example, conducted by Yasatuka Tominaga, 
examines the variation in group resistance to targeting and finds that organizations with the time 
to become “institutionalized” develope a succession system and are thereby resistant to 
leadership targeting, whereas small organizations led by charismatic leaders are usually unable to 
replace leaders or sustain the group.38  
 
33 Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” 100. 
34 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark.” 
35 Jordan, 38. 
36 Jordan, 38. 
37 Jordan, 38. 
38 Yasutaka Tominaga, “Organizational Context Matters: Explaining Different Responses to Militant Leadership 
Targeting,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, November 26, 2019, 15, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219885896. 
Principal-Agent Problem 
Similar to Jordan's examination of various terrorist group characteristics, another 
essential question addresses how terrorist groups react internally to leadership decapitation. 
Answering this question explains much of the violence against civilians that frequently occurs 
after leadership targeting. There is a consensus in the literature that when insurgent or terrorist 
leaders are removed from their organizations, lower-level members are empowered to act with 
less restraint and target civilians more frequently than their superiors.39 This phenomenon is an 
example of the principal-agent problem, where the principal maintains a position of leadership 
over the agent. In terrorist organizations, this problem manifests itself when lower-level 
members want to engage in indiscriminate violence, which the leader restrains due to an 
understanding that senseless violence undermines the terrorist organization's message. 
Humphreys and Weinstein find evidence of this principle in their 2006 study, conducted 
before the drone campaign was fully underway, which discovers that the internal dynamics of 
fighting factions in Sierre Leone accurately predict the likelihood that the faction will commit 
violence against civilians.40 Humphreys and Weinstein find high levels of civilian victimization 
in groups that “were unable to police the behavior of their members because they are more 
ethnically fragmented, rely on material incentives to recruit participants, and lack mechanisms 
for punishing indiscipline.”41 Therefore, their findings support Wood's earlier argument that 
weak groups lacking resources are more likely to resort to violence, and they show the 
 
39 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 429–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062289; Max 
Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” 
International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000411; Abrahms and 
Mierau, “Leadership Matters,” September 3, 2017. 
40 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 100, no. 3 (August 2006): 429–47, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062289. 
41 Humphreys and Weinstein, 429. 
significance of leadership discipline in preventing civilian victimization. Max Abrahms and 
Phillip Potter observe that the principle which Harvey and Weinstein find in fighting factions in 
Sierre Leone holds in terrorist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions as well. They 
argue that because lower-level members usually have fewer reasons against targeting civilians 
than their leaders, leadership deficits created by drone strikes allow for increased civilian 
victimization by these lower-level members.42 Interestingly, a recent study also conducted by 
Max Abrahms suggests that affiliate organizations are more likely than their parent organizations 
to attack civilians, likely because they prioritize immediate goals and benefit more from 
indiscriminate attacks than their parent organization, which often pays the associated “cost” of a 
terrorist attack on civilians.43 
           Several studies show that not only do leadership decapitations degrade terrorist 
leadership, empowering low-level members and increasing civilian targeting, they also alter the 
nature of the organization's attacks.44 Abrahms’ and Potter's study shows that while drone strikes 
do effectively limit subsequent attacks against “hard” military targets in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, terrorist attacks against “soft” targets increase in the wake of drone strikes; this 
alteration in target type suggests that terrorist groups become less discriminate in selecting attack 
locations after a strike.45 The Taliban leadership especially emphasize to their subordinates 
against harming civilians and discipline strictly those who disobey those orders, so the fact that 
attacks against civilians increase in the wake of leadership decapitations in Abrahms’ and 
 
42 Abrahms and Potter, “Explaining Terrorism,” 335. 
43 Max Abrahms, Matthew Ward, and Ryan Kennedy, “Explaining Civilian Attacks,” Terrorism Research Initiative 
12, no. 1 (2020): 24. 
44 Abrahms and Potter, “Explaining Terrorism,” 2015; Abrahms and Mierau, “Leadership Matters,” September 3, 
2017. 
45 Abrahms, Ward, and Kennedy, “Explaining Civilian Attacks.” 
Potter's study clearly demonstrates the literature's consensus: an absence of leadership within a 
terrorist organization allows lower-level members to conduct attacks more indiscriminately.46  
 
Strike Effectiveness 
One of the most pressing questions in modern counterterrorism studies is: are targeted 
killings effective at degrading the organization? This question is highly relevant to current 
counterterrorism policy, which relies heavily on drone strikes to eliminate terrorist threats with 
precision and minimal collateral damage. The “effectiveness” of targeted killing is usually 
evaluated by the number of terrorist attacks occurring after the strike and the lethality and 
frequency of those attacks. In his study of the IDF's targeted killing campaign against Hamas, 
Byman finds that fewer numbers of Israeli citizens and soldiers were killed each subsequent year 
after 2001, even though the number of Hamas attacks was actually increasing as the IDF's 
campaign continued—Byman, therefore, concludes that because casualty rates were decreasing, 
the IDF had effectively lowered Hamas' capacity.47 Another study of Palestinian violence 
examining targeted killings by the IDF agrees with Byman's conclusion, finding that although 
intended Palestinian violence increased, this violence was less lethal.48 A study conducted by 
Johnston in 2012 similarly finds that leadership decapitation “reduces the intensity of terrorist 
violence” and the “frequency of terrorist attacks.”49 In 2016, the RAND corporation specifically 
analyzed the effects of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan and determines that they correlated to 
decreases in both the occurrence and lethality of terrorist attacks against tribal elders.50 A more 
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recent study conducted in 2018 by Jaeger and Siddique supports RAND's finding and earlier 
conclusions about the effects of targeted killings: in examining drone strikes in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, they find that drone strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan have a “negative 
deterrent/incapacitation effect in the second week.”51 
However, considerable conflict exists in the literature regarding this question of whether 
or not targeted killings are effective. Because scholars and policymakers measure “effectiveness” 
in different ways, observations of violence are also interpreted very differently; for example, 
Byman and Jordan view the same data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and arrive at opposite 
conclusions. Where Byman concludes that the lowered lethality of Hamas' attacks post-2001 is 
indicative of the organization's decreased capacity, Jordan argues that the increased frequency of 
Hamas' attacks post-2001 actually suggests an increased capacity, arguing that a heightened 
organizational capacity would have been necessary to conduct more attacks.52  
Researchers continue to debate whether leadership decapitation actually results in a 
subsequent increase in violence or whether it is indeed effective at reducing terrorist attacks. 
Johnston states that “leadership decapitation…reduces the frequency of insurgent attacks,”  yet 
multiple scholars, including Jordan, Byman, and Jaeger and Paserman, cite the documented 
increase in the number of Hamas attacks after the IDF's targeted killings campaign as a 
counterexample to Johnston's argument.53 The Israeli-Palestinian example is not the only one in 
contrast to Johnston's claim: Jaeger and Siddique also find that drone strikes against the Taliban 
in Pakistan have a “positive vengeance effect in the first week” following a strike, yet this effect 
 
51 Jaeger and Siddique, “Are Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan?,” December 1, 2018, 696. 
52 Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” 103; Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” December 2, 2009, 751. 
53 Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?,” 50; Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” 103; Jordan, “When Heads 
Roll,” December 2, 2009, 751; David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, “Are Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence between the United States and the Taliban,” CESifo Economic Studies 
64, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 340, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ify011. 
decreases in the second week.54 Another conflict occurs between Johnston and Jordan's works in 
their perspectives on the organizational effects of drone strikes: Johnston argues that there is 
little empirical evidence suggesting decentralized groups may be more resilient to 
counterinsurgency efforts, whereas Jordan points to the fact that “the decentralized nature of 
many current terrorist organizations has proven to be highly resistant to decapitation and other 
counterterrorism measures.”55  
Despite these studies, a significant gap remains in the literature on drone strikes—to 
quote Abrahms, “there is a need for further studies examining the effects of 'slighter change' on 
terrorist groups.”56 In other words, current studies focus on drone strikes that successfully 
eliminate a terrorist leader, looking at how these strikes influence the terrorist organization in 
terms of organizational structure, subsequent attacks, and targeting patterns; therefore, they fail 
to consider the many strikes which target low-level militants or miss their target altogether and 
how these strikes impact terrorist functions.  
This study will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by first examining the relationship 
between airstrikes in Pakistan and TTP violence to evaluate whether increased airstrikes 
correlate to changes in terrorist violence. When Jaeger and Siddique examined the impacts of 
U.S. drone strikes against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, they found “a 
possible reallocation of attacks over time in response to unsuccessful strikes,” but their results 
were inconclusive and required “further research… to understand how unsuccessful strikes alter 
the timeline of later terrorist violence.”57 This study will attempt to build upon their findings and 
examine how terrorist violence changes in the weeks following a strike. Abrahms, too, 
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emphasizes the need for research into whether “slighter changes in the composition of militant 
groups have similar effects [as leadership decapitations] on their tactical decisions.”58 While this 
study will only look at one example, the TTP, it will start to explore how “slighter change,” in 
the form of failed drone strikes and strikes against low-level militants, influences terrorist 
violence. 
Examining TTP violence in Pakistan could potentially begin resolving several of the 
conflicts previously discussed within the literature and provide potential answers to the question 
of how drone strikes affect terrorist organizations. Using the TTP as a case study is helpful for a 
variety of reasons. First, it provides a unique opportunity to further explore the relationship 
between combatant power and violence, as described by Wood. According to Humphrey's and 
Weinstein's model, a group's control over territory has no impact on observed levels of abuse; 
however, this assertion conflicts with personal accounts of violence, which argue that “as 
factions lost control of areas, fighting groups inferred that civilians had informed the other side 
and exacted retributions.”59 The TTP are currently engaged in a “defensive jihad” against the 
Pakistani military, which provides a clearer combatant versus opponent example than other 
terrorist groups whose primary objective is war against the United States.60 Reports of TTP 
violence also show that they often attack tribesmen following drone strikes and accuse these 
civilians of providing the United States with information leading to drone strikes. A case study of 
TTP violence against civilians can further elucidate whether the assertion of a relationship 
between territorial control and violence, which Humphreys and Weinstein reject, holds any 
weight. 
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A case study of the TTP could also begin to resolve some of the disputes between Jordan 
and Johnston specifically. Johnston's 2012 study “Does Decapitation Work?,” which finds that 
leadership decapitations reduce both the frequency and lethality of subsequent terrorist attacks, 
does not include any Islamist insurgencies post 9/11.61 Therefore, his findings may not be 
representative of fundamentalist Islamist groups such as the TTP, which have more similarities 
with groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, than do many of the terrorist and insurgent 
groups included in his analysis. Examining the TTP could also start exploring Jordan's prediction 
that weakening the Al-Qaeda core in Pakistan emboldens its affiliates, of which the TTP is one, 
by looking at how the TTP conducted attacks over time.62  
The TTP also represent an opportunity to examine how a terrorist leader who survived 
a failed targeted killing operates within the organization. Abrams and Potter argue that when a 
strike fails to connect with its intended target, it still forces the target and other leadership to 
“assume a diminished posture within the organization to prioritize security over control, resulting 
in agency loss.”63 However, this phenomenon has not always proved true in Islamist terrorist 
groups, which often use failed strikes for propaganda material as evidence of the United States' 
weakness in the Middle East. Jaeger and Siddique also note the importance of Taliban rhetoric, 
noting that the benefits of terrorism to the TTP are greater “particularly if those actions are 
rhetorically linked to drone strikes, as Baitullah Mehsud claimed in 2009.”64  
I hypothesize that both the quantitative analysis and the case study will demonstrate that 
TTP violence against civilians increases in Pakistan following frequent drone strikes. I predict 
that this trend occurs for two main reasons. First, TTP violence likely increases in the wake of 
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drone strikes because the TTP accuse civilians of spying for the United States and providing the 
United States with intelligence that assists in U.S. drone strikes. Thus, the TTP kill and kidnap at 
higher rates during periods of increased strike activity to eliminate civilians suspected of being 
“informants” and dissuade those who might consider informing against the Taliban from doing 
so.  
Second, I predict that drone strikes against low-level militants impact the TTP similarly 
to how drone strikes against terrorist leaders impact other terrorist groups. As drone strikes 
weaken the TTP compared to its opponent, it will become more likely to target civilians, 
similarly to how the terrorist groups surveyed in Abrahms’ and Potter’s study became more 
likely to attack civilians following a leadership decapitation.65 Since previous studies have only 
traced the impacts of removing a terrorist leader without analyzing the consequences of 
eliminating low-level members, this study will examine these consequences by including drone 
strikes against low-level militants in the analysis. The deaths of these low-level militants are 
similar to what Wood describes as “battlefield losses” experienced by insurgent groups, which 
Wood states create a resource need that thereby forces the group to target civilians to satisfy that 
need.66 This relationship between civilians as victims and militants as attackers, as they weaken 
relative to their opponent, is generally accepted in the literature. 
The case study will also explore a particular occurrence described by Abrahms and 
Potter: failed strikes which the United States publicly announced were intended to eliminate a 
specific individual, but which ultimately failed to do so. These strikes may affect terrorist groups 
similarly to successful strikes by forcing leaders into hiding, thereby creating the “diminished 
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posture” effect predicted by Abrahms and Potter. The case study of the TTP provides an 
opportunity to explore this effect, as there are instances of this phenomenon occurring in the 
group; for example, when TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud survived a U.S. drone strike on 
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III. Quantitative Analysis 
           To begin answering the question of how drone strikes influence terrorist violence, I 
analyzed how U.S. airstrikes and other forms of military intervention influenced Tehrik-i Taliban 
(TTP) attacks from 2010 to 2020. The TTP is the umbrella organization for over 40 militant 
groups in Pakistan and is one of the most violent groups in the region.68 The TTP operate in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces of 
Northwestern Pakistan, a region representing one of the primary focuses of the U.S. drone 
campaign.69 To determine whether any relationship exists between drone strikes and terrorist 
violence, I performed a series of simple linear regression and multiple linear regression tests 
using a dataset created from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).70  
ACLED’s database includes the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of reported 
violence and protest events from around the world, and it aims to “capture the forms, agents, 
dates, and locations of political violence and protest as it occurs within developing states.”71 
ACLED relies on news sources to report terrorist attacks, so it is possible not every attack is 
recorded or recorded accurately. However, ACLED surveys a variety of media to create a 
comprehensive database of political violence, including traditional media at the subnational 
level, reports from international organizations, local partner data, and “new media” (verified 
social media accounts). ACLED also frequently verifies and updates its databases as necessary. 
Furthermore, previous studies of drone strikes and civilian victimization, such as Wood’s “From 
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Loss to Looting: Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence,” have relied upon 
ACLED’s database of political violence and protest events.72 
For this study, I created a dataset from the ACLED database that includes TTP attacks 
against civilians from January 1, 2010, to December 19, 2020, and state and external group 
attacks against the TTP during the same time period. I hypothesize that a relationship does exist 
between U.S. airstrikes and TTP attacks against civilians. Because ACLED categorizes any air-
to-ground strike as an airstrike, the quantitative analysis looks at all U.S. airstrikes against the 
TTP, including drone strikes and other forms of air-to-ground strikes. However, the purpose of 
this study is to go beyond the literature’s previous focus on leadership decapitation strikes and 
analyze how general drone strikes affect TTP violence. Therefore, including other forms of U.S. 
airstrikes beyond drone strikes in the analysis provides a larger dataset that comprises the entire 
scope of U.S. air operations against the TTP. The quantitative analysis results thereby begin 
filling in the gap in the literature by testing the relationship between TTP violence and general 
airstrikes, rather than focusing exclusively on the relationship between TTP violence and 
leadership decapitations specifically, as had been the focus of previous studies. 
 
Dataset 
           In order to limit the dataset to only those events which were relevant to my analysis, I first 
eliminated any attack against civilians in which the perpetrator group was not the TTP, which 
included eliminating attacks perpetrated by the Nazir Group and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, 
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both of which are part of the Pakistani Taliban but not the TTP.73 Next, I focused on limiting the 
state and external attacks that occurred in Pakistan to only those conducted against the TTP. 
ACLED categorizes each event according to the type of interaction observed between two actors, 
so I used this categorization to limit the events included in the dataset to only those events that 
involved the TTP. Because ACLED identifies an actor based on its goals and does not use the 
term “terrorist,” the TTP can either be classified as a “rebel group,” an “identity militia,” or a 
“communal militia.” Therefore, only the following types of interactions needed to be included in 
the dataset because these interactions comprise all of the types of interactions involving the 





Interaction Type Interaction Example 
12 Military vs. Rebels Civil war violence between state forces 
and a rebel actor 
14 Military vs. Communal Militia Military engagement with a communal 
militia 
23 Rebels vs. Political Militia 1. Civil war violence between rebels and a 
pro-government militia 
2. Violence between rebels and 
unidentified armed groups 
28 Rebels vs. Others 1. Civil war violence between rebels and 
an allied state military 
2. Rebel violence against a UN operation 
34 Political Militia vs. Communal 
Militia 
Violence between communal militia and 
an unidentified armed group; violence 
between political militia and local security 
providers 
48 Communal Militia vs. Other External state military engaging in 
violence against a communal militia 
I then filtered the data to include only events in which the TTP was the secondary actor, 
meaning that state and external attacks were directed against them.  
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I decided to include TTP attacks against civilians and state and external group attacks 
against the TTP occurring in every province in Pakistan except for the Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad 
Jammu/Kashmir provinces. These regions are contested by India and located on the Pakistani 
border, so distinguishing between terrorist violence and border skirmishes would have been 
difficult. The TTP are based in FATA and KPK, but TTP attacks range from Pashtun territory 
and the city of Quetta in Northwestern Pakistan to the major city of Karachi in Southern 
Pakistan.74 The majority of attacks occur in Balochistan, FATA, KPK, and Sindh, with fewer 
attacks occurring in Punjab and in the Federal Capital Territory, where Islamabad is located. The 
TTP represents over 40 Islamist and Pashtun tribal groups and is ethnically diverse, so members 
come from all of Pakistan’s regions, although the majority of TTP members are Pashtun or 
Punjabi Taliban.75  
 
Explanatory Variables 
           I selected six explanatory variables for this analysis, including: government airstrikes, 
government airstrike fatalities, government ground strikes, government ground strike fatalities, 
U.S. airstrikes, and U.S. airstrike fatalities. Each of these variables was aggregated over 30 days 
to determine whether a previous month of military operations impacts the number of civilians 
killed in TTP attacks on a specific day. The first variable, government airstrikes, measures any 
airstrikes conducted against the TTP by non-U.S. forces in Pakistan and primarily includes 
Pakistani military and police actions. ACLED includes any air-to-ground strike in this category, 
so both drone strikes and strikes by manned aircraft are included in this variable. I selected this 
variable to compare non-U.S. airstrikes against U.S. airstrikes to determine whether non-U.S. 
 
74 Stanford University, “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.” 
75 Stanford University. 
airstrikes and U.S. airstrikes affect TTP violence differently. The second variable, government 
airstrike fatalities, measures the number of militants killed in all non-U.S. airstrikes during the 
previous 30 days. This variable provides another measure of the intensity of the government 
airstrikes conducted since infrequent government airstrikes can still be influential if they kill a 
high number of militants. The third variable, government ground strikes, also focuses on non-
U.S. military action, measuring the number of non-U.S. military actions that were not airstrikes 
that occurred over 30 days, such as: armed clashes, government regain of territory, and shelling, 
artillery, and missile attacks. I selected this variable to compare other forms of military action 
against airstrikes to determine whether ground strikes impact civilian deaths differently than 
airstrikes. The fourth variable, government ground strike fatalities, measures the number of 
people killed in 30 days of the aforementioned military operations, and it acts as another measure 
of the intensity of military operations against the TTP, similarly to government airstrike 
fatalities. The fifth variable, U.S. airstrikes, measures the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted 
over 30 days. This variable isolates the factor being explored in this study to determine if there is 
a relationship between U.S. airstrikes and TTP violence. Finally, the sixth variable, U.S. airstrike 
fatalities, measures how many militants were killed in U.S. airstrikes over 30 days, similarly to 
the government airstrike fatalities and government ground strike fatalities variables. This 
variable, therefore, also provides another measure of the intensity of the airstrikes conducted by 




           To determine how the above explanatory variables influence terrorist violence, I measured 
how each variable was associated with the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks on a single 
day. This variable allows me to determine whether the military operations conducted in the 30 
days prior to the date in question impacts how many civilians die in TTP attacks on that specific 
date. 
I also included an explanatory variable that measures the number of civilians killed in the 
7-14 days prior to the specific date measured by the response variable. This week would 
therefore occur in the middle of the 30 days being measured by the explanatory variable. I 
included this variable to reflect escalating violence in the region; it can therefore be used to 
measure how violence is changing over time to determine whether observed trends in civilian 
deaths are due to airstrikes or rather to increasing violence on the ground. 
 
Table #1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Government Airstrikes (30)  2.825 3.928 0 22 
 Government Airstrikes Fatalities 
(30) 
36.921 59.247 0 344 
 Government Ground Strikes (30) 17.960 15.440 0 97 
 Government Ground Strikes 
Fatalities (30) 
101.176 107.798 0 676 
 U.S. Air Strikes (30) 2.793 0.071 0 24 
 U.S. Air Strikes Fatalities (30) 20.808 33.456 0 219 
 Civilians Killed (7 Day) 12.197 10.510 0 78 
Dependent 
Variable 
Civilians Killed (Daily) 12.137 18.677 0 239 
Government airstrike fatalities over 30 days and government ground strike fatalities over 
30 days have the widest ranges, with the maximum number of militants killed in a month of 
government airstrikes and government ground strikes reaching 344 and 676, respectively. 
Government ground strike fatalities over 30 days has the highest mean of any of the variables, 
with an average of approximately 101 militants killed in every month of government ground 
strikes. This mean is almost triple the average number of militants killed in government airstrikes 
over 30 days and more than five times the average number of militants killed in U.S. airstrikes 
over 30 days. The mean number of government ground strikes over 30 days is drastically higher 
than the mean number of U.S. airstrikes conducted over 30 days, with an average of 
approximately 18 government ground strikes compared to an average of approximately 3 U.S. 
airstrikes in a month. The number of government ground strikes conducted over 30 days also 
varies more than the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted over 30 days, with a standard deviation 
of 15.440 compared to a standard deviation of 0.071. The number of government airstrikes 
conducted over 30 days varies more than the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted over 30 days, 
with a standard deviation of almost 4. 
           The mean number of civilians killed also has a wide range, with an average of 
approximately 12 civilians killed in TTP attacks per day and as many as 239 civilians killed in a 
single day of TTP attacks. 
 
Methodology 
           First, I used excel to perform a series of bivariate linear regressions on each of the 
explanatory variables and the response variable and create scatterplots to examine trends in the 
data. 
Table #2: Bivariate Linear Regression Results for Civilians Killed in TTP Attacks Per Day  
Explanatory Variable Slope R-Squared 
Government Airstrikes 0.983* (0.086) 0.042 
Government Airstrikes Fatalities 0.062* (0.005) 0.039 
Government Ground Strikes 0.303* (0.022) 0.062 
Government Ground Strikes Fatalities 0.047* (0.003) 0.074 
U.S. Airstrikes 0.857* (0.088) 0.031 
U.S. Airstrikes Fatalities 0.106* (0.010) 0.036 
n=2954 
(standard deviation) 
Each row represents an individual bivariate linear regression 
*Significant at the 95% confidence level 
 
 
 According to the series of simple linear regression tests, government ground strike 
fatalities have the most explanatory power of any of the explanatory variables and explain about 
7% of the variation in daily civilian casualties. U.S. airstrikes and U.S. airstrike fatalities explain 
about 3% of daily civilian deaths. Scatterplots of these two relationships, between government 
ground strike fatalities over 30 days and daily civilian deaths and between U.S. airstrikes over 30 
days and daily civilian deaths, show that civilian deaths seem associated with the explanatory 


























   The scatterplots show that there appears to be a relationship between these variables, but 
it is difficult to distinguish because there are far more civilians killed than there are U.S. 
airstrikes. I then took the natural log of the response variable to normalize the data and account 
for the high number of civilians killed in TTP attacks. I then ran the same series of bivariate 
linear regression tests using the same explanatory variables and the natural log of the response 
variable. 
 
Table #4: Bivariate Linear Regression Results for the Natural Log of Civilians Killed in TTP 
Attacks Per Day 
Explanatory Variable Slope R-Squared 
Government Airstrikes (30) 0.073* (0.006) 0.055 
Government Airstrikes Fatalities (30) 0.005* (0.000) 0.049 
Government Ground Strikes (30) 0.023* (0.001) 0.084 
Government Ground Strikes Fatalities (30) 0.003* (0.000) 0.088 
U.S. Airstrikes (30) 0.073* (0.006) 0.053 
U.S. Airstrikes Fatalities (30) 0.008* (0.001) 0.052 
n=2954 
(standard deviation) 
Each row represents an individual bivariate linear regression 
*significant at the 95% confidence level 
 
 
 According to the results of the series of bivariate linear regression tests shown in Table 
#4, taking the natural log of civilians killed per day yields slightly stronger correlations than 
shown in Table #3, where the response variable is not logged. Government ground strikes still 
hold the most explanatory power, explaining about 8% of the variation in the logged number of 
civilians killed per day. U.S. airstrikes explain about 5% of this variation. 
           Next, I performed a series of multiple linear regression tests in excel using government 
ground strikes fatalities over 30 days, which had the most explanatory power in the previous 
simple linear regression tests, as well as U.S. airstrikes over 30 days, the explanatory variable I 
am most interested in relating to the response variable. 
 
Table #5: Multiple Linear Regression Results for Civilians Killed in TTP Attacks on 1 Day (std. 
dev.) 
Explanatory Variable Slope 
Government Ground Strikes Fatalities (30) 0.035* (0.093) 
U.S. Airstrikes (30) 0.382* (0.093) 
Civilians Killed in 7-Day Period  0.122* (0.001) 
R2 = 0.083 
n =2940 
*Significant at 95% confidence level 
 
 This model explains about 8% of the variation in civilian deaths per day and predicts an 
increase of .38 civilian deaths for each additional U.S. airstrike. Running the same multiple 
linear regression test using the natural log of the civilians killed per day yields a stronger 
correlation. 
 
Table #6: Multiple Linear Regression Results for the Natural Log of Civilians Killed in TTP 
Attacks on 1 Day (std. dev.) 
Explanatory Variable Slope 
Government Ground Strikes Fatalities (30) 0.003* (0.000) 
U.S. Airstrikes (30) 0.045* (0.006) 
Civilians Killed in 7-Day Period  0.008* (0.003) 
R2 = 0.112 
n =29540 
*Significant at 95% confidence level 
 
 This model is better than the previous one, as it predicts about 11% of the variation in 
logged civilian deaths per day. However, the best model appears to be one that takes the natural 
log of U.S. airstrikes as well as the natural log of civilian deaths per day. 
 
Table #7: Multiple Linear Regression Results for the Natural Log of Civilians Killed in TTP 
Attacks on 1 Day (std. dev.) 
Explanatory Variable Slope 
Government Ground Strikes Fatalities (30) 0.002* (0.000) 
ln_U.S. Airstrikes (30) 0.247* (0.023) 
Civilians Killed in 7-Day Period  0.007* (0.003) 
R2 = 0.117 
n =29546 
*Significant at 95% confidence level 
 
 This model predicts about 12% of the variation in logged civilian deaths per day. 
According to the model, a 10% increase in U.S. airstrikes predicts an increase in daily civilian 
casualties of 2.5%. 
The strength of the relationship between government ground strike fatalities over 30 days 
and civilians killed per day and between U.S. airstrikes over 30 days and civilians killed per day 
is also demonstrated in scatterplots of the natural logs of these variables. The scatterplots show a 
clear association between the variables and that civilian deaths per day increase as government 
























I also used a multiple linear regression test to determine whether the opposite hypothesis 
was true, and daily U.S. airstrikes increase in response to increased civilian deaths. I used the 
variables which measure the number of civilians killed 14-7 days before the date in question, in 
this case, the date of the U.S. airstrike, to measure escalating TTP attacks against civilians and 
determine whether U.S. airstrikes are in response to this escalation in violence.  
  
Table #8: Multiple Linear Regression Results U.S. Airstrikes (std. dev.) 
Explanatory Variable Slope 
Government Ground Strikes (30)  0.001 (0.001) 
U.S. Airstrikes (30)  0.027 (0.002) 
Civilians Killed in 7-Day Period  -0.000 (0.001) 
R2 = 0.075 
n =29540 
*Significant at 95% confidence level 
  
 The variable is not statistically significant, so it is likely that the relationship between the 
variables is not zero, and U.S. airstrikes do not increase with each additional civilian death. 
           The bivariate linear regressions tests between each explanatory variable and the response 
variable were all significant. The quantitative analysis thus shows that my hypothesis is correct, 
and U.S. drone strikes conducted over 30 days do explain a small percentage of the number of 
civilians killed in TTP attacks per day. However, government ground strikes over 30 days and 
government ground strike fatalities over 30 days explain a higher percentage of the number of 
civilians killed in TTP attacks per day. The model that accounts for the most variation in the 
response variable is the one that takes both U.S. airstrikes over 30 days and government ground 
strike fatalities over 30 days into account, explaining approximately 12% of the variation in the 
number of civilians killed in TTP attacks per day. 
IV. Case Study 
           I conducted a case study of the Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) to explore potential explanations 
for why an increase in U.S. airstrikes is associated with an increase in the number of civilians 
killed in TTP attacks, as shown in the quantitative analysis. The TTP are a terrorist organization 
operating primarily in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces of Northwestern Pakistan, one of the most targeted regions of the 
U.S. drone campaign. The first part of the case study compares TTP attacks in 2008-2009 to 
attacks in 2010-2011 to determine how TTP attacks changed from a period of low drone strike 
frequency to a period of higher drone strike frequency. The second part analyzes two types of 
attacks committed by the TTP, attacks against alleged spies and suicide attacks, to evaluate the 
relationship between these methods of violence and drone strikes. The third part explains how 
drone strikes influence TTP attacks against U.S. interests, NATO operations, and the Pakistani 
state. Finally, the last part provides examples of how drone strikes alter TTP leadership structure 
and the repercussions of that restructuring on TTP violence.    
 
Method 
           If the hypothesis that drone strikes increase terrorist violence against civilians is true, as 
supported by the quantitative analysis, I expect to observe an increase in TTP violence in the 
case study during periods of increased strike activity. 
 I first compared TTP violence during two time frames: 2008-2009 and 2010-2011. These 
two periods represent periods of significantly different strike total and frequency; during this 
time U.S. drone strikes increased by over 300%, so it is reasonable to conclude that changes in 
TTP violence between these two periods are due to the increase in strike activity. To compare 
these two periods, I used the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies' (PIPS) Security Reports, 
which are yearlong analyses of terrorist and insurgent attacks, tribal clashes, sectarian terrorism, 
ethnopolitical violence, cross-border attacks and clashes, operational attacks by security forces 
and clashes with militants, kidnappings, and search-and-arrest operations by law enforcement 
agencies. The reports rely on newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources, official reports in 
both English and Urdu, and regional newspapers and weeklies from each Pakistani province, as 
well as interviews with police, consultants in each provincial capital, and security experts who 
provide their analyses of events. 
Second, I analyzed two particular methods of violence frequently engaged in by the TTP: 
attacks against people accused of being spies and suicide attacks. To evaluate the relationship 
between drone strikes and attacks against alleged spies, I examined the history of attacking spies 
in the region, specific attacks on alleged spies, and interviews with tribespeople about how drone 
strikes impact this kind of violence. I used the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), a database 
focusing on terrorism and related issues in South Asia, for this part of the case study because it 
includes yearly timelines of all the instances of violence in Pakistan beginning in 2000. 
I divided suicide attacks into similar time periods as described in the first part of the case 
study and analyzed them separately from other types of attacks. The TTP quickly became the 
terrorist organization responsible for the majority of suicide attacks in Pakistan, which can be 
viewed as a measure of increasing TTP capacity to commit violence during intensifying periods 
of drone strikes. I used the PIPS Security Reports for this part of the case study as well. 
Third, I examined how drones are involved in the relationship between the TTP, the 
United States, and Pakistan. To accomplish this goal, I surveyed examples of TTP attacks against 
U.S. interests, Western interests, and Pakistan, as well as TTP propaganda and statements 
released regarding these attacks. I used the PIPS Security Reports and SATP to identify relevant 
attacks. 
Finally, I found examples of the various ways in which drone strikes have altered 
leadership structure in the TTP, including unifying tribal leaders and terrorist organizations, 
unifying militant groups, removing terrorist leaders, and empowering terrorist leaders. I 
researched each of these instances to determine how the change in leadership structure 
influenced subsequent terrorist violence. Along with the PIPS Security Reports and SATP, I also 
used news articles of these attacks from Dawn and BBC. 
 
Comparison of TTP Violence: 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 
 
Figure 1. Drone Strikes in Pakistan. 
 





TTP Violence: 2008 
Baitullah Mehsud unified various Taliban factions and militant groups to form the TTP in 
December of 2007, yet by 2008, the terrorist organization operated in the Kurram, Swat, Bajau, 
North Waziristan, and South Waziristan Districts of FATA and represented the coordination of 
over 40 local militant groups against the Pakistani government.76 2008 is also the year that the 
United States began escalating its drone war in Pakistan; there were 36 total drone strikes in 
2008 compared to only 4 in 2007, which killed an estimated 208 militants in 2008 compared to 
only 51 in 2007.77 I began my analysis of the TTP in 2008, rather than in previous years when 
fewer drone strikes occurred because the TTP were not formed until the end of 2007. Despite 
unifying just a few months prior, the TTP were the terrorist group responsible for most of the 
attacks on NATO supplies in 2008.78 They also managed to abduct two Chinese nationals, Zhang 
Guo and Long Xiao Wei, whom they unsuccessfully attempted to trade in exchange for 136 
Taliban fighters.79 The TTP engaged in suicide attacks throughout the year, although not yet to 
the extent observed in later years.  
  
TTP Violence: 2009 
           The number of drone strikes increased from 2008 to 2009, as did the number of estimated 
militants killed; from 36 to 54 drone strikes, and from 208 to 370.5 estimated militants killed, 
from 2008 to 2009, respectively.80 The TTP engaged in similar attacks in 2009 as they did in 
2008, including abductions, suicide attacks, and attacks on Western organizations. However, the 
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attacks themselves were larger, demonstrating an increasing capacity of the TTP to plan and 
execute violence. For example, the TTP used a 209 vehicle convoy to kidnap more than 500 
students and teachers from a college in North Waziristan in June 2009, a massive increase from 
the two Chinese nationals abducted the previous year.81 The TTP also kidnapped Upper Dir 
District Coordination Officer Ateefur Rehman, the first of what would eventually become many 
political leaders targeted by the terrorists.82 Yet neither of these attacks accomplished any 
strategic goals—a jirga council of Mehsud tribes urged leader Baitullah Mehsud to let the 
college students go, and Rehman was simply released, suggesting that the TTP still lacked a 
clear strategy at this time.83  
           The number of suicide attacks conducted by the TTP dramatically increased this year, to 
the point that the TTP were responsible for the most suicide attacks in Pakistan.84 The attacks 
began specifically targeting clerics and tribal leaders who publicly opposed the TTP.85 The 
attacks reached as far as Muzaffarabad, Jammu and Kashmir's capital, which is approximately 
240 miles from FATA, another indication of the TTP's growing capacity to conduct violence.86  
 
TTP Violence 2010 
           Although drone strikes increased between 2008 and 2009, the rate at which they increased 
from 2009 to 2010 was unprecedented in Pakistan—by 2010, the U.S. had deployed 122 drone 
strikes, an increase of 225% from 2009.87 The number of estimated militants killed increased as 
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well, by a factor of 210%, with 778.5 estimated militant deaths in 2010.88 TTP violence in the 
year 2010 also increased dramatically and demonstrates more organization and stronger 
capabilities in the terrorist group. TTP attacks in 2010 specifically targeted Awami National 
Party (ANP)89 leaders, religious leaders who threatened TTP authority, and peace efforts. TTP 
kidnappings became more strategic in that they were more clearly intended to coerce the 
Pakistani government into exchanging prisoners or negotiating with the terrorists than were 
previous abductions in 2008 or 2009. The TTP also engaged in sectarian violence and targeted 
schools, indicating that any institution not conforming to the TTP's strict interpretation of Islam 
or undermining their authority was at risk.90 
During this year, TTP specifically increased attacks against political leaders, engaging in 
violence strategically conducted to undermine the Pakistani government's legitimacy and deter 
others from opposing the TTP. At this time, the ANP vocally supported anti-Taliban operations 
in FATA and in KPK, the province in which they comprised the majority of the government.91 In 
retaliation for their anti-Taliban stance, the TTP specifically attacked ANP rallies, leaders, and 
members.92 Several of these attacks were targeted assassinations of high-profile political leaders 
and their family members, including: the murder of ANP leader and KPK Information Minister 
Mian Iftikhar Hussain's only son; the shooting of Khogh Badshah, a former district president of 
ANP; and the death of Ghani-ur-Rehman, a former KPK irrigation minister, who died in an 
improvised explosive device (IED) explosion.93 TTP militants also targeted the Swat University 
Vice Chancellor for using his position to speak out against the Taliban, as he argued that suicide 
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bombing is un-Islamic.94 According to the PIPS Security Report, the TTP conducted the most 
high-profile attack of 2010 on December 7, when they attempted to kill the Chief Minister of 
Balochistan, Nawab Aslam Raisani, in a suicide bombing at a railway crossing.95  
           TTP attacks against NATO and NATO interests also continued in 2010. On October 3, 
TTP militants attacked a convoy of NATO oil tankers near Sihala, which is on the Islamabad 
Capital Territory's periphery.96 This same year, Pakistani police arrested TTP commander 
Samiullah in the city of Islamabad.97 These developments are significant because they 
demonstrate that the TTP's reach continued to expand from within FATA and KPK to other 
regions of Pakistan. The attacks against NATO interests are also related to increases in U.S. 
drone activity, as TTP spokesperson Azam Tariq stated, “We will intensify attacks with 
intensification of U.S. drone strikes on us.”98  
           The diversification of TTP targets in 2010 to include attacks on political leaders, parties, 
and the political process in Pakistan demonstrates that the TTP have a more clearly defined goal 
than they did in previous years of trying to destabilize the current government and threatening 
anyone who participates in that government. The success of their attacks against the government, 
evidenced by the high-profile assassinations, suggests an increasing capability to coordinate and 
carry out lethal attacks. 
           The TTP continued to utilize the tactic of abducting for ransom and kidnapping in 2010, 
turning to the tactic to generate funds or using abductees as bargaining chips to negotiate the 
release of captured TTP members.99 In June, the TTP demanded the release of TTP militants in 
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exchange for 33 Pakistani soldiers who had disappeared after an attack on a security forces' 
convoy in the Mohmand District of KPK, threatening to kill the soldiers if the government failed 
to meet their demands.100 The TTP also tried to force the government's hand when they 
kidnapped Dr. Ajmal Khan, the pro-vice-chancellor of Islamia College at the University of 
Peshawar, also a cousin of a prominent ANP leader, demanding that the government meet with 
them.101  
           These abductions have clearer goals than those observed in 2009 when the TTP released 
the captured students and Ateefur Rehman. The abductions of 2010 demonstrate a defined 
objective of using kidnappings to coerce the government into releasing militants or negotiating 
with the terrorists. 
           The TTP also continue to specifically attack civilians outside of the political process, 
demonstrating an intentional strategy of using violence and fear to reinforce TTP authority 
among the civilian population. Although the TTP engaged in violence against non-combatants 
since its inception in 2007, by 2010, these attacks had increased significantly in scale. For 
example, the TTP set fire to an entire abandoned village of at least 63 homes, located in the 
Lower Orakzai District of KPK, after the village's inhabitants refused to remain to help the TTP 
fight incoming Pakistani security forces.102 In the Mastung district of the Balochistan province, 
the TTP issued a threat that they intended to attack any private school that did not replace 
“Western-style uniforms” with traditional clothing, including full Islamic hijab for female 
students.103 This threat shows that by this time, the TTP expected their authority to extend into 
multiple aspects of life; they aimed not just to alter the government in Pakistan but also the 
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country's religion and culture. In this vein, the TTP frequently carried out attacks against 
minority religious groups, including Shia and Ahmedis communities. In May 2010, the TPP 
attacked two places of worship in the Ahmedis community in Lahore, killings 100 people and 
injuring 150 more.104  
           
TTP Violence: 2011 
           U.S. drone strikes decreased overall in 2011, with a total of 70 strikes that killed an 
estimated 415.5 militants.105 This total is still more strikes and more estimated militant deaths 
than in either 2008 or 2009, and I would expect to continue observing the effects of the previous 
year of high drone strike frequency into 2011. According to the PIPS Security Report analyzing 
the year 2011 in Pakistan, the second half of the year was relatively peaceful compared to 
previous years; however, it is essential to note that improvements were made in Punjab, 
Kashmir, and Islamabad, not in KPK, FATA, and Balochistan.106 In the latter provinces, violent 
incidents continued to increase—making this distinction is critical because most U.S. drone 
strikes target, in order of frequency, FATA, KPK, and Balochistan.107   
           In 2011, the TTP continued to target government representatives, engage in sectarian 
violence, and deploy suicide bombers. The TTP sent two suicide bombers to attack the home of 
the Frontier Corps Deputy Inspector general, which killed at least 28 people, among them a 
Frontier Corps Colonel and the Deputy Inspector General's wife.108 In the district of Deza Gazi 
Khan, located in South Punjab, sectarian violence raged throughout 2011; the TTP took part in 
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the violence, killing 50 people in an attack on an Urs109 celebration and killing another 50 in a 
suicide bombing at a shrine in the town of Sakhi Sarwar.110 The TTP were still responsible for 
the majority of suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2011, although the total number of suicide attacks 
decreased this year. 
 
Comparison of Violence: 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 
           The diversification in TTP attack targets observed between the periods of 2008-2009 and 
2010-2011 shows that, as U.S. drone strikes increased in frequency from 36 strikes in 2008 to a 
peak of 122 strikes in 2010, the TTP began targeting a greater variety of targets, including: 
political leaders, government functionaries and institutions, Western interests and NGOs, 
religious authorities, minority groups, and non-combatants. The diversification in target type and 
the increasing numbers of people killed and injured in these attacks, despite increased drone 
frequency, provides evidence against the hypothesis that drone strikes decrease terrorist attacks 
and suggests that drone strikes may have a role in increasing terrorist violence. The inclusion of 
state targets in this list and the TTP's success in killing high-profile government targets also 
indicates that drone strikes may encourage terrorist organizations to unify around a common 
objective, as the increase in drone strikes shortly after the TTP's formation appears to have 
occurred simultaneously with the TTP's definition of a clear strategy of undermining Pakistani 
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Attacks Against Alleged Spies 
In this section, I examine TTP attacks against people the terrorist group accuses of spying 
for the U.S. or Pakistani government. Before the formation of the TTP in 2007 and the beginning 
of the drone campaign in Pakistan, pro-Taliban militants occasionally killed alleged “spies;” 
these attacks appear associated with terrorist and militant spillover from Afghanistan following 
the U.S. invasion in 2001. However, as the U.S. drone campaign intensified in Pakistan, so too 
did TTP killings of alleged spies, and the killings themselves became connected to the U.S. 
presence in Pakistan and to the drone strikes specifically. 
           According to Asif Iqbal Dawar, a scholar who spent 14 months researching in Pakistan's 
tribal areas, an atmosphere of paranoia exists in Northwestern Pakistan: he describes how 
security forces establish a “vernacular surveillance network, locally known as 'Samsery' 
(source)” after completing military operations. These sources report any terrorist or anti-
government activity, and there are approximately 10-15 sources per village. However, “there is 
[also] a reign of terror created by unidentified assailants locally known as Nikab Posh (masked 
man),” militants who abduct local people on accusation of spying. By 2009, the Taliban had 
killed almost 200 tribal elders accused of being Pakistani or American spies. Thousands more 
have been abducted by various militants and accused of assisting the United States in the drone 
attacks against “foreign militants,” likely referring to the terrorist groups operating across the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani, and Al-Qaeda. In order to 
intimidate local people and dissuade “sources” and anyone intent on helping Pakistan or the 
United States, the militants often leave notes on the bodies of the abducted and killed that warn 
that “anyone who contacted the government or army would face the same fate.”111  
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           Although the U.S. drone campaign did not intensify in Pakistan until 2008, the United 
States presence in the region began in 2001 with its invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion forced 
Al-Qaeda to take refuge in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region, after which the United States 
shifted its focus to Pakistan in 2004.112 Yet despite military activity occurring for several years 
along Pakistan's northwestern border, there were no spy-related attacks in 2000, 2001, or 2003 in 
Pakistan.113 In 2002 and 2004, there was only one spy-related attack per year, but it is notable 
that in 2004 a tribesman was accused of being a U.S. spy, which is the first mention of U.S. ties 
in a spy-related attack.114 There are four instances of militants killing alleged spies in 2005, all of 
which targeted tribesmen, and two of which accused the deceased of spying for the United 
States.115 In 2006, the first note warning against spying was discovered alongside the headless 
body of Khismat Khot and read: “This man was a spy and he was passing information to 
Pakistan and American Intelligence networks.”116 The number of spy-related attacks spiked to 44 
in 2008, the same year that the U.S. drone campaign began in earnest in Pakistan, and continued 
increasing in subsequent years. 
The next year, in 2009, the Guardian published an article claiming that the CIA in 
Pakistan was paying tribesmen to place electronic transmitters, or “chips,” on the person of 
known terrorists or outside of their homes.117 Several scholars subsequently cited this article, 
although the Guardian's article is the only piece making this claim about the “chips,” and no 
other source independently confirms these claims. However, the effects that the idea that these 
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“chips” exist have on militant violence is well-documented in multiple sources. For example, 
communities in Waziristan believe in these “chips” and think that these devices are how U.S. 
drones identify and strike targets; consequently, many people fear being tagged with a chip, 
leading to suspicion and distrust within these communities.118 Not only do people fear being 
tagged themselves as a terrorist, they fear being suspected by the militants in their region of 
tagging someone else with a terrorist “chip” because the Taliban frequently execute people 
suspected of being informants.119  
The TTP also frequently leave notes with the mutilated bodies of their attack victims to 
serve as a warning to other civilians against informing against the TTP. In February of 2010, the 
headless bodies of three men were discovered in North Waziristan along with a note that read, 
“they were U.S. spies—anybody found engaged in espionage will meet the same fate.”120 In a 
similar incident in March 2011, the TTP left the “bullet-riddled” bodies of four local tribesmen 
beside a road in Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan, with notes “pinned to their 
chest” that read, “We killed them because they were spying for America, anyone who acts like 
this will face the same fate.”121  
           These attacks do not just target people accused of spying for the United States; they often 
specifically target people suspected of assisting the United States to conduct drone strikes in the 
region. In May of 2010, the TTP killed a tribesman “for his alleged involvement in a drone 
attack in North Waziristan.”122 Villagers in Khadi village, located in Mir Ali in North 
Waziristan, said they found his “bullet-riddled body” with a note as well, which claimed that the 
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deceased had been a spy for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.123 A TTP faction devoted to tracking 
“American spies” expressly warned the people of North Waziristan against assisting the United 
States with drone strikes and providing information on the TTP. In an Urdu pamphlet displayed 
on the wall of the Miranshah market, the TTP told locals that they should not help anyone 
reporting on the TTP, nor should they interfere if the TTP decides to “kidnap someone on 
suspicion of spying for the Americans,” as any captured spies would be “possibly killed 
immediately.”124  
           Prior U.S. military and covert operations in the region also contribute to the TTP's fear of 
spies and consequential retribution against non-combatants. In 2012, the TTP banned the polio 
vaccination program in North Waziristan, arguing that the program was an operation for U.S. 
spies to infiltrate Pakistan.125 In their statement to local media, the TTP referenced Shakeel 
Afridi, a doctor who used a similar health program to help the CIA identify Osama bin-Laden 
through DNA samples.126 The TTP also cited the U.S. drone strikes as one of their reasons for 
banning the program, stating that: “After consultation with the Taliban Shura, servant of 
Mujahideen in North Waziristan Agency Hafiz Gul Bahadur has decided that there will be a ban 
on polio campaign as long as drone strikes are not stopped.”127  
           These attacks against alleged spies and the TTP's ban on the polio vaccination program 
demonstrate that the TTP retaliate against non-combatants because of their fear of drone strikes. 
From 2010 to 2020, 19 out of 220 attacks were against an accused spy, but from 2010 to 2011, 
the period of heightened drone strike frequency, 16 out 90 attacks were against an accused spy. 
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There are several explanations for the TTP's paranoia: first, Pakistani military operations 
frequently use spies, or samsery, to identify militants in Northwestern Pakistan; second, rumors 
concerning the existence of CIA “chips” used to locate and track militants in the tribal regions 
cause the TTP to execute anyone suspected of working with U.S. or Pakistani intelligence; third, 
the TTP are aware of prior U.S. operations in the region such as the one that found and killed 
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, meaning that the TTP are cautious to prevent future U.S. 
intelligence operations in the region; and fourth, the intensity of the U.S. drone program—
deploying anywhere from 5 to 23 strikes per month in 2010—undoubtedly creates an 
environment of fear and paranoia, as the drones continue to target and kill militants, who do not 
understand how the United States is identifying them. 
           People living in the tribal regions of Northwestern Pakistan confirm that the TTP retaliate 
out of fear of drone strikes, stating that the violence committed by terrorists against civilians in 
2010 was unprecedented and increased in relation to U.S. drone strikes.128 The Washington Post 
reported that “Espionage has long been viewed as an egregious offense in the lawless borderland, 
but residents say the current pace of assassination is unprecedented.”129 At the same time as the 
article's publication, a “massive surge” in CIA drone strikes targeted North Waziristan, the base 
of TTP operations.130 Tribesmen said that they found bodies alongside the roads and in nearby 
fields almost daily, each with a note warning that “All American spies will meet the same 
fate.”131 Because of the strikes, villagers remain indoors and fear being labeled as a spy—many 
of them say fear of being called a spy outweighs fear of being killed in a drone strike.132 The 
 






U.S. campaign in North Waziristan has had “far-reaching consequences,” according to 
tribesmen,” and has provoked “cycles of violence” perpetuated by militants in the region.133  
Suicide Bombings 
           Within a year of their formation, the TTP quickly progressed in their capacity to 
perpetuate the most suicide attacks of any terrorist or militant group in Pakistan.134 According to 
PIPS, their “targeting patterns clearly reflected the desire of Pakistani Taliban a) to inflict 
maximum damage on state machinery in order to weaken its resolve and to diminish its capacity 
to continue the struggle against militancy in Pakistan; and b) to instill terror and create anarchy 
in the society.”135 This understanding of TTP strategy explains why the TTP targets military and 
police, political leaders, diplomatic missions of western countries, and leaders of rival groups—
but also peace committees, religious leaders, minority groups, and non-combatants.136 Overall, 
TTP suicide attacks demonstrate a purposeful strategy to reinforce TTP power and undermine 
any threats against their authority.137  
 Because the TTP quickly become the terrorist group responsible for the majority of 
suicide attacks in Pakistan, isolating this form of violence provides an opportunity to analyze 
how the TTP progressed so effectively in their capacity to conduct suicide attacks despite 
simultaneously increasing drone strikes. Furthermore, suicide attacks as a form of violence are 
intended to terrorize society, especially when directed against non-combatants and civilian 
targets such as religious minorities, schools, and tribespeople.138 Unlike other forms of violence 
that have a clear strategic purpose of undermining Pakistani authority, such as political 
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assassinations and kidnappings, suicide attacks may be specifically directed towards non-
combatants and focused on controlling the civilian population. Therefore, it is useful to analyze 
suicide attacks independently from other forms of violence to evaluate how TTP strategy 
evolved over time, how their capacity to conduct these attacks progressed, and how their use of 
violence against specifically non-political targets changes as drone strikes increase in frequency.  
           Similar to other forms of TTP violence explored earlier in the case study, TTP suicide 
attacks become more frequent and more lethal between 2008 and 2010, indicating the group's 
increasing capacity during that time frame, despite simultaneously increasing drone strikes. In 
2008, the TTP were responsible for only a fraction of suicide attacks in Pakistan and focused 
their attacks on police, government, tribal, and sectarian targets.139 The table below highlights 
the number of attacks in 2008 in FATA which the TTP are responsible for: 
 




Figure 2. TTP Suicide Attacks in FATA in 2008. 
 
“Pakistan Security Report 2008,” Pakistan Security Reports (Islamabad, Pakistan: PAK Institute 
for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 5, 2009), 21, https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/pakistan-
security-report-2008. 
 
           By 2010, however, the number of TTP suicide attacks increased dramatically, as did the 
scope of the attacks they engaged in and the type of targets they selected.140 In 2010, the TTP 
continued attacking tribal leaders, but they also began targeting rival militant organizations 
directly, such as Lashkar-e-Islam.141 TTP suicide attacks against police increased dramatically, 
and the group began targeting police check posts, police stations, police lines, and police 
convoys.142 In addition, the TTP began targeting the check posts, camps, convoys, and personnel 
of other government security forces in Pakistan, including the Frontier Corps and Security 
Forces, as well as the Khasadar tribal militia.143 TTP attacks against the government were also 
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more various in 2010 than in 2008. Although the TTP notably attacked the ANP president in 
2008, their suicide attacks in 2010 targeted government offices, government officials, and 
political rallies, including: the Crime Investigation Department Office, the Special Investigation 
building, an ANP rally, and a Jamaat-e-Islami (J.I.) rally.144 The attack against the J.I. party 
signified a significant change in the TTP's strategy, because J.I. is a religious party that controls 
most of the religious seminaries in Pakistan, where many fundamentalist terrorists are educated; 
so, the fact that the TTP decided to attack the J.I. rally suggests that the terrorists were unwilling 
to cooperate with any party operating under the authority of the Pakistani state.145  
           The TTP also began specifically targeting peace efforts in 2010, including both the tribal 
groups working for peace and government installations for peace, through suicide attacks on 
peace jirgas and attacks against the Pakistani Peace Committee.146 Sectarian violence in 2010 
was similar to that of 2008, although the number of suicide attacks against religious minorities 
doubled.147 The most high-profile suicide attack of 2010 occurred in Peshawar in April, when 
vehicle suicide bombers drove into the U.S. Consulate; after the bombing, the TTP claimed 
responsibility for the attack and stated that it was revenge for the drone strikes against 
Northwestern Pakistan.148  
           The changes observed in TTP suicide attacks between 2008 and 2010 demonstrate 
increased capability in the TTP. Below is a table of the TTP's suicide attacks in FATA in 2010—
in contrast to 2008, the TTP are responsible for every single suicide attack in FATA in 2010. The 
TTP's ability to successfully plan and execute attacks against military and police targets is 
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evidence of their increased capacity, as is the notable attack against the U.S. Consulate, a severe 
attack both in terms of the target's significance and in the lethality of the attack. The attacks 
against the government also signify that the TTP have resolved to become the authority in 
Pakistan by this time and that they do not believe they can cooperate with the current 
government structure nor with anyone participating in it. 
 
 
Figure 3. TTP Suicide Attacks in FATA in 2010. 
 
“Pakistan Security Report 2010,” Pakistan Security Reports (Islamabad, Pakistan: PAK Institute 
for Peace Studies (PIPS), January 5, 2011), 51–52, 
https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/pakistan-security-report-2010. 
 
Violence Against the State 
The TTP are anti-American for a variety of reasons, but most important among them for 
this case study is the fact that they resent the presence of the U.S. military in the region and view 
the United States as supporting Pakistan. U.S. and NATO intervention following the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan exacerbated the insurgency in Pakistan by creating the need for a 
“defensive jihad” to expel foreign forces from the region. Because Pakistan supported U.S. and 
NATO military operations and is perceived as a U.S. ally, the TTP are able to apply this idea of 
“defensive jihad” to Pakistan as well and claim that the Pakistani government is illegitimate. In 
doing so, the TTP justifies their attacks against the illegitimate Pakistani state and argues for the 
establishment of a religious government. While it is unlikely that TTP attacks against Pakistan 
would cease in accordance with decreasing U.S. drone strikes, it is difficult to determine how the 
TTP would respond to such an event: several TTP leaders have cited drone strikes as the reason 
for their attacks against Pakistan, and Hakimullah Mehsud claimed he was open to talks with 
Pakistan if U.S. drone strikes were discontinued.149 Regardless, U.S. drone strikes appear to be a 
component of TTP violence against Pakistan, as they are a conspicuous example of U.S. military 
presence in the region and pose a serious threat to the TTP as an organization. Thus, the strikes 
prompt the TTP to attack Pakistan in an attempt to coerce Pakistan into convincing the United 
States to stop the strikes; they also encourage TTP attacks against Western targets for the same 
reason. The TTP often cite the drone strikes as justification for their attacks against the United 
States, NATO, and Pakistan: Hakimullah Mehsud, a leader of the TTP, summarized the TTP's 
perspective of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, stating that “The 
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government of Pakistan bombs innocent tribal people due to the pressure of America... Drone 
strikes conducted by Americans were [backed] by Pakistan. Then the Americans pressed 
Pakistan to start ground operations in these areas, and Pakistan complied.”150  
 
Violence Against the United States 
           The TTP's anger towards the United States has been continually exacerbated by U.S. and 
NATO military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as by frequent U.S. drone strikes 
in Pakistan's tribal areas.151 The TTP attack against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar is a prime 
example of TTP violence against the United States that was intended to avenge the TTP for the 
U.S. drone strikes.152 The TTP also possibly supported Faisal Shahzad when he attempted to 
bomb New York Times Square in 2010, which would suggest that TTP capacity had increased to 
such extent that they were able to conduct an attack overseas in the United States. Shahzad's 
attack was also retaliation for the drone strikes, which Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah 
Mehmood Qureshi acknowledged in a CBS interview by saying “This is retaliation. And you 
could expect that… let's not be naïve. They're not going to sort of sit and welcome you (to) 
eliminate them. They're going to fight back.”153   
 
Violence Against NATO 
           There are many examples of the TTP attacking NATO operations, most frequently NATO 
convoys, but these examples of violence are also often directly related to drones as the TTP use 
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these attacks to try and coerce the United States to cease drone strikes. TTP spokesperson Azam 
Tariq expressed this strategy when he declared that “We will intensify attacks with 
intensification of U.S. drone strikes on us.”154 Maulvi Omer, another TTP spokesperson, 
similarly stated that TTP attacks on NATO terminals were “a response to the Americans for their 
drones inside Pakistan,” and that the attacks would continue if drone strikes continued.155 He also 
threatened to expand TTP attacks on NATO supply vehicles in other regions of Pakistan if the 
United States did not reduce drone strikes in Afghanistan.156 On October 9, 2010, the TTP 
attacked NATO supply convoys in the Sibi District of Balochistan and threatened to conduct 
future attacks if drone attacks did not cease. Azam Tariq stated: “We accept responsibility for the 
attacks on the NATO supply trucks and tankers in Sibi District on Saturday…We will continue 
such attacks until the drone strikes are stopped.”157 These attacks provide a clear example of TTP 
violence directly related to drone strikes and demonstrate how drone strikes cause terrorists to 
engage in violence. As drone strikes increase, the terrorists are more likely to resort to 
increasingly lethal attacks against NATO operations in an attempt to make the continuation of 
strikes too costly for the United States to continue them.  
 However, U.S. drone strikes represent only one aspect of TTP violence against NATO 
forces in Pakistan; the TTP also direct attacks against NATO interests in support of militant 
groups in Afghanistan, or in contest against other rival militant groups operating in Pakistan. At 
the end of 2008, NATO forces witnessed increased attacks on parking terminals in Peshawar 
against trailers and other vehicles used to supply coalition forces in Afghanistan.158 In the same 
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time period, the TTP began attacking NATO forces after clashing with Amr Bil Maroof 
militants, who had been extorting NATO for money in exchange for protection from other 
militant groups, such as the TTP.159 It is also possible that the TTP attack NATO targets in 
retaliation for Pakistani military operations, as Lashkar-e-Islam160 did after a military operation 
was launched against it in 2009.161 
 
Violence Against Pakistan 
           There are numerous examples of TTP violence against the Pakistani state; however, many 
of the attacks are similar to the attacks against NATO operations discussed previously in that 
they are specifically revenge attacks for drone strikes. These attacks are intended to force the 
Pakistani government to convince the United States to stop the drone strikes by making 
continued Pakistani support for drone strikes too costly for Pakistan. After the TTP attacked 
Pakistan's Special Intelligence Agency, TTP spokesperson Azam Tariq stated that the attack 
“was to avenge drone attacks and military operations in the Tribal Areas. We have 2,800 to 
3,000 more suicide bombers…We will target all Government places, buildings, and offices.”162 
Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a leader of one of the TTP factions, threatened to break the peace deal 
reached with the Pakistani government in 2011 if the drone attacks did not cease, stating that: 
“The peace agreement was made for the establishment of peace in the region but the people of 
North Waziristan Agency are continuously being targeted with drone attacks and now 
the jirga's are not even safe.”163  
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           The TTP have made it clear that the consequences to the Pakistani state and the Pakistani 
people are and will continue to be severe if drone strikes against militant groups are not halted. 
Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the TTP, threatened to expand TTP attacks outside of the 
northwestern region, and both Bahadur and Mullah Nazir, the leader of another TTP faction, 
have stated that they attacked the government because of drone strikes.164 The previously-
mentioned TTP suicide attacks in Muzaffarabad provide a prime example, as the TTP claimed 
the attacks were “a revenge for the Waziristan operation and air strikes.”165  
However, the TTP not only conduct attacks out of revenge for drone strikes, they also 
engage in violence in retaliation for Pakistani military operations. The quantitative analysis 
supports this point as well, since government ground strikes were found to be highly correlated 
with TTP attacks. PIPS records a sharp increase in the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan in 
2006 and 2007 following the operation against Lal Masjid in Islamabad, noting that the 
continued increase in terrorist attacks observed through 2009 can be attributed to “a desperate 
reaction by the terrorists to successful military operations in Swat and South Waziristan.”166 
During 2009, Pakistan conducted five major military operations into its northwestern tribal 
regions, including: Operation Rah-e-Rast (the true path) in Malakand Division; Operation Rah-e-
Nijat (path of deliverance) in South Waziristan Agency; and operations Darghalam, Bia-
Darghalam and Kwakhbadesham in KhyberAgency.167 Operation Rah-e-Rast, which specifically 
targeted the TTP, continued through 2010, during which year the government continued to 
respond to terrorist violence with wide-ranging military interventions, including campaigns in 
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Kohat in January, in the Kala Dhaka area of KPK in April, and in Peshawar in September.168 
Altogether, the intensity of the Pakistani government’s military response to terrorist violence 
likely contributes to TTP violence against the Pakistani state, exacerbating TTP hostility toward 
Pakistan and providing further justification for their “defensive jihad” against Pakistan.  
 
Altering Leadership Structure 
           The ways in which drone strikes affect the leadership structures of terrorist organizations 
has been well-documented in security studies, but this case study aims to go beyond previous 
descriptions of leadership change and explain how leadership changes observed in the TTP 
subsequently influenced terrorist violence. The four main structural changes I observed in the 
TTP were: the unification of tribal leaders and terrorist organizations, the unification of militant 
groups, the removal of terrorist leaders, and the empowerment of terrorist leaders.  
 
The Unification of Tribal Leaders and Terrorist Organizations 
           The relationship between tribal communities in Northwestern Pakistan and the terrorist 
groups operating there is highly complex for several reasons. Many tribes initially welcomed the 
TTP because they punished criminals and thereby provided a means to order and justice, whereas 
some of the governing tribes had previously been incapable of policing their areas.169 However, 
because of the extreme violence perpetrated by the militants, the strict Sharia law they imposed, 
and the frequent brutal attacks against civilians, the tribes quickly turned against the militants. 
But both the TTP and the tribesmen living in FATA and KPK fear drone strikes, as the drones 
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constantly surveil the region and can deploy missiles at any time that not only eliminate high 
numbers of TTP members but that also kill hundreds of non-combatants. In this way, the drone 
strikes serve to unite the TTP and tribal groups. For example, the Amedazi Wazir tribes held 
a jirga to meet with the TTP after a drone strike killed senior terrorist leader Ilyas 
Kashmiri.170 The tribes convinced the TTP not to retaliate against non-combatant tribesmen in 
retaliation for the drone strike and to uphold the 2007 “peace deal” reached with the 
government.171 This example illustrates the cycle of violence created by drone strikes and how 
civilians fear that the United States will respond to TTP retaliatory attacks with increased drone 
strikes, thus encouraging the Amedazi Wazir tribes to negotiate with the TTP.172  
 
Unification of Terrorist Groups 
           One of the ways drone strikes unify terrorist groups is by removing a terrorist leader, 
which then creates an opportunity to merge two separate organizations. This phenomenon 
occurred after Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP, was killed in a drone strike on August 5, 
2009. After Baitullah Mehsud's death, Sirajuddin Haqqani, a Haqqani leader, intervened and 
supported appointing Hakimullah Mehsud as the new amir of the TTP.173 Hakimullah had served 
under both Baitullah Mehsud and Sirajuddin Haqqani in a raid in Afghanistan, so he was able to 
unify the TTP and Haqqani for a period of time due to his experience with both groups.174 This 
alliance increased the capacity of the TTP's organization by providing them with access to the 
Haqqani's resources. For example, shortly after Hakimullah Mehsud became amir, Mullah Nazir 
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released a video announcing that he had turned against Pakistan because of U.S. drone strikes; 
however, this video was unlike previous TTP propaganda because Al-Qaeda’s media 
organization recorded the video.175 The Haqqani are known to have close ties to Al-Qaeda, who 
operate one of the most successful propaganda campaigns of any terrorist group, so Nazir's use 
of their technology demonstrates how the TTP's unification with the Haqqani increased the 
former's capabilities.  
           Other potential impacts on terrorist functions arising from the unification of militant 
groups include increased ability to plan and conduct attacks and reduced in-fighting. As 
discussed in previous sections on TTP capacity for violence, the TTP could conduct more 
frequent and more lethal attacks after their formation than they previously could when operating 
as independent local Taliban or militant factions. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
alliance of two major terrorist organizations would have a similar impact on how terrorist attacks 
were conducted. Previous sections also discussed how the TTP use suicide attacks against rival 
factions, such as against Lashkar-e-Salam; so, cooperation between militant groups would mean 
fewer rivals for the TTP to target and more opportunities to direct violence against non-
combatants, thus increasing TTP victimization of civilians. 
 
Removal of Leaders 
           Drone strikes primarily aim to eliminate high-level terrorist leaders to weaken terrorist 
organizations; however, drone strikes can also have the opposite effect by promoting low-level 
members to leadership positions. These leaders often they lack their predecessor's restraint and 
tend to engage in more indiscriminate violence. The death of Baitullah Mehsud and the 
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subsequent appointment of Hakimullah Mehsud as leader of the TTP again provides a prime 
example, as TTP attacks immediately increased after Mehsud became amir of the TTP.176  
 
Empowering TTP Leaders 
           As discussed in the literature review, Max Abrahms predicts that drone strikes that aim to 
eliminate a specific terrorist leader can succeed even if their target survives the attack because 
the failed drone strike forces terrorist leaders to adopt a “diminished posture” within the terrorist 
organization.177 However, analysis of a specific instance of this phenomenon in the TTP reveals 
that Abrahms' prediction is not always accurate. On January 14, 2010, the United States 
deployed a drone strike to eliminate Hakimullah Mehsud, and initial reports following the strike 
announced that the strike had successfully killed him. However, Mehsud later appeared in a TTP 
video of the execution of Pakistani ISI official Sultan Amir Tarar, stating that, “The media 
sometimes propagates about my martyrdom and sometimes claims that the operation in South 
Waziristan has been completed.” 178 Mehsud also claimed that the lies about his death were just 
an attempt to demoralize the Taliban, and that because U.S. drone strikes posed a threat for 
Pakistan's security and sovereignty, “From now onwards the government will be responsible for 
any severe step to be taken by the Taliban.”179  
Despite being targeted by a drone strike, it appears that Hakimullah Mehsud effectively 
harnessed the United States' failure to kill him by turning it into proof of his own power and 
evidence of U.S. weakness in the region. His announcements to his Taliban followers suggest 
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that he was undeterred by the threat of drone strikes and intended to continue the TTP's violent 
jihad against Pakistan and the United States. BBC reporter Aleem Maqbool interviewed 
Hakimullah Mehsud after the failed drone strike and concluded that “there is an impression that 
the militants in this region feel that they have the upper hand. It is clear that Hakimullah Mehsud 
believes he can now call the shots.”180 According to Maqbool, “It was clear he [Mehsud] is 
powerful, feared, and respected among the Taliban.”181 Hakimullah Mehsud's purposeful 
appearance in a TTP propaganda video and his statements to the media contradict Abrahms' 
prediction, as they demonstrate that Mehsud did not adopt a “diminished posture” within the 
TTP, but rather assumed an even more conspicuous and outspoken position. Furthermore, the 
power he accumulated as a leader after the drone strike failed to kill him on January 14 shows 
that leaders can actually benefit from failed strikes and thereby plan and conduct more attacks, 
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V. Discussion 
         Previous studies on drone strikes focused almost exclusively on leadership decapitations 
and failed to account for how the entirety of the drone campaign impacts terrorist violence. This 
study aims to fill this gap in the literature by considering how all drone strikes, including failed 
strikes and strikes against low-level militants, influence terrorist violence. In order to address this 
omission in the literature, this study analyzes violence in the Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP), a terrorist 
organization operating in the tribal region of Northwestern Pakistan in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces. The quantitative 
analysis first determines that a relationship exists between U.S. airstrikes and subsequent TTP 
violence. Next, the case study of the TTP explores how and why the trends in TTP violence 
observed in the quantitative analysis occurred. 
According to the quantitative analysis, there is a relationship between U.S. airstrikes and 
TTP attacks: as the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted over the previous 30 days increases, the 
number of civilians killed in TTP attacks per day also tends to increase. The analysis shows that 
TTP violence also increases as the number of militants killed in U.S. airstrikes increases. 
Considering that previous studies only examined the effects of leadership decapitations, these 
findings are significant because they demonstrate that drone strikes against low-level militants 
also influence terrorist violence; therefore, these findings suggest that the drone campaign as a 
whole may be associated with increased terrorist violence. 
The quantitative analysis also shows that of all of the explanatory variables, the number 
of militants killed in government ground strikes over the previous 30 days is the best predictor of 
the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks per day. The number of government ground strikes 
conducted over the previous 30 days also has more explanatory power than either government 
airstrikes or U.S. airstrikes. After controlling for government and U.S. airstrikes, government 
ground strikes still explain approximately 8% of the variation in the logged number of civilians 
killed per day, and government ground strike fatalities explain almost 9% of this variation. There 
are several potential reasons why government ground strikes and government ground strike 
fatalities hold more explanatory power than either government or U.S. airstrikes. First, there are 
over six times more government ground strikes conducted in an average month than either 
government or U.S. airstrikes. Second, the average number of militants killed in government 
ground strikes over the previous 30 days is almost three times that of government airstrikes and 
almost five times that of U.S. airstrikes. Because the average number of government ground 
strikes conducted over the previous 30 days is so much higher than the average number of 
government or U.S. airstrikes conducted in the same time period, government ground strikes may 
be more influential in degrading the TTP. The government ground strike fatalities variable 
supports this hypothesis: government ground strikes kill far higher numbers of militants than 
either government airstrikes or U.S. airstrikes, so they likely have a more significant impact on 
terrorist organizations. Wood's finding that an actor becomes more likely to target civilians to 
“reshape the strategic landscape to its benefit” as it weakens relative to its adversary explains 
why the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks per day increases in response to increased 
government ground strikes: as the government ground strikes weaken the TTP, they become 
more likely to target civilians out of a need to satisfy resource needs and an inability to police the 
population.182 However, the case study of the TTP shows that these reasons do not fully explain 
TTP violence; rather, the TTP appear to be “reshaping the strategic landscape” to their benefit by 
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using attacks against civilians to make military operations too costly for either the Pakistani 
government or the United States to pursue due to the mounting number of civilian casualties. 
Another potential explanation for the strength of the relationship between government 
ground strikes and civilian deaths is the TTP's goal of overthrowing the Pakistani state and 
establishing an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan.183 Because the TTP are engaged in a “defensive 
jihad” against the Pakistani military, meaning that the military conducts operations against TTP 
bases in Northwestern Pakistan directly, government military action on the ground may likely 
have more of an impact on TTP attacks than do airstrikes. Furthermore, many of the TTP's 
attacks against civilians are directed toward this purpose of overthrowing the Pakistani 
government or are intended as revenge for government military action; so, the TTP may be more 
likely to react to government ground strikes by killing civilians than they are to airstrikes. 
         Government airstrikes and U.S. airstrikes conducted over the previous 30 days explain 
approximately the same amount of variation in the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks per 
day, each accounting for about 5% of the variation in the logged number of civilian deaths. 
Government airstrikes and U.S. airstrikes explain this amount of variation even when controlling 
for government ground strikes. ACLED categorizes airstrikes as air-to-ground strikes that occur 
in the absence of any other engagement, so this relationship between airstrikes and civilian 
deaths is not explained by civilian deaths increasing in association with airstrikes that occur as 
part of a larger overall military operation. 
         It is likely that the association between government and U.S. airstrikes conducted over the 
previous 30 days and civilian deaths per day is weaker than the association between government 
ground strikes conducted over the previous 30 days and civilian deaths per day because 
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government and U.S. airstrikes do not degrade terrorist organizations as significantly as ground 
operations do. This hypothesis is supported by several previous studies of drone strikes and by 
the case study of the TTP. Jaeger and Siddique find in their study of the Taliban in Pakistan that 
vengeance attacks increase in the week following a drone strike, and Jordan finds that leadership 
targeting is unlikely to be effective against large, religious organizations like the TTP.184 The 
case study of the TTP also shows that, despite intense periods of drone strikes from 2010-2011, 
the TTP diversified their targets during this period, and their attacks simultaneously became 
more frequent and more lethal. Drone strikes, therefore, do not appear to have a strong 
degradation effect on the TTP, in contrast to the RAND corporation's study, which finds that 
drone strikes in Pakistan decrease the occurrence and lethality of terrorist attacks against tribal 
elders.185 
         Nor do airstrikes appear to weaken the TTP to a point where they are unable to use attacks 
against civilians as their primary method of combatting the government. According to the 
literature, weak groups rely on this tactic of civilian victimization; however, I observed an 
increase in capacity to conduct progressively larger and more violent attacks in the TTP during 
periods of intense drone strikes. This observation suggests that, although the TTP is not strong 
enough to rely on other means of combatting the government, such as providing incentives to 
encourage civilian support as Wood suggests is indicative of a stronger group, they are still 
capable of conducting large-scale, successful attacks against civilian and military targets. 
         The best model in the quantitative analysis appears to be the one that takes both ground 
strikes and airstrikes into account. Including both ground strikes and U.S. airstrikes over the 
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previous 30 days incorporates both pieces of the military operations against the TTP in the model 
and thus reflects how the TTP become more likely to target civilians as the operations against 
them intensify. This observed trend suggests that military operations against the TTP are 
weakening the group relative to their adversary, the Pakistani military, but demonstrates that a 
consequence of degrading the TTP is its increased targeting of civilians. This conclusion is 
supported by Wood's findings that foreign interventions increase a combatant's willingness to 
target civilians; in the case of the TTP, U.S. airstrikes in support of the Pakistani military 
increase the TTP's willingness to attack civilians. This finding in the case study is supported by 
the quantitative analysis as well, which demonstrates that the best model is one that includes both 
government ground strikes and U.S. airstrikes.186 
The case study of the TTP provides an opportunity to explore how terrorist violence 
increases during and after periods of heightened drone activity and potential explanations for 
why I observed these increased periods of violence. The case study reveals that during periods of 
heightened drone activity, TTP attacks became more frequent, more geographically widespread, 
more lethal, and were directed against a greater variety of targets. During 2010-2011, the most 
active years of the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan, the TTP engaged in more suicide attacks 
and diversified their range of targets to include political and religious leaders, government 
institutions, military and police, and Western interests. This increase in attacks and 
diversification of targets indicates that TTP capacity to plan and execute attacks was still 
increasing despite frequent drone strikes in the region. The case study contradicts previous 
assumptions that drone strikes degrade terrorist organizations and that they had this effect on the 
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TTP; the TTP appears to have strengthened their capabilities during heavy strike bombardment, 
rather than weakening as would be expected. 
One of the potential explanations for this observed strengthening is the formation of the 
TTP itself. In December of 2008, several months after the Pakistani military operation against 
Lal Masjid in Islamabad, a shura of 40 Taliban leaders created the TTP for the express purpose 
of enhancing their defense capabilities.187 The formation of the TTP unified over 40 independent 
groups within the Pakistani Taliban under a single leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and the Mehsud 
tribe within the TTP became the most powerful faction within the group.188 Although the TTP is 
highly decentralized, and members take direction from local leaders, the creation of the TTP still 
provided more structure and leadership than the various groups had previously.189 
Drone strikes also had unifying effects on the leadership structure of the TTP, which 
could have resulted in the increased capacity of the organization overall. Because U.S. drone 
strikes anger both the TTP and local tribes, there are instances in which the two groups have 
allied, such as when TTP commanders agreed to the Ahmedzai Wazir tribes' request to support 
the 2007 peace deal in South Waziristan.190  An alliance between the TTP and local tribes could 
potentially strengthen the TTP by allowing them to focus their efforts against the Pakistani state 
instead of against tribespeople, enabling them to direct the majority of their attacks against 
political targets and military and police forces. 
U.S. drone strikes had a similar unifying effect in the TTP and the Haqqani's relationship 
when Hakimullah Mehsud, who succeeded Baitullah Mehsud as head of the TTP after the latter 
was killed in a drone strike, allied the two groups through his combat experience under Haqqani 
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leaders and his ties to the Mehsud tribe.191 Hakimullah Mehsud was appointed leader of the TTP 
in August 2009, less than a year before the TTP's increased capacity for violence was observed 
in 2010 and 2011, so his leadership and the group's alliance with the Haqqani could explain the 
observed increase in TTP capacity.192 The TTP are also closely aligned with Al-Qaeda, but the 
TTP's first leader, Baitullah Mehsud, facilitated this relationship beginning in late 2007 and early 
2008.193 
Although it began several years before the number of TTP attacks began increasing, the 
relationship between Al-Qaeda and the TTP may still explain the observed increase in TTP 
capacity to conduct attacks. In her study “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why 
Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” Jordan finds that leadership decapitations had 
the potential to embolden Al-Qaeda's affiliates, which proved highly resistant to U.S. targeting 
operations.194 While the TTP is not an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the same way that Al-Qaeda in the 
Arab Peninsula or Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent is, the TTP is closely associated with Al-
Qaeda.195 Unlike the Haqqani and the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda supports the TTP's anti-
Pakistan stance and assists the TTP in conducting attacks against the Pakistani state.196 
Furthermore, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation's (CISAC) 
Militant Mapping Project classifies the TTP as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, defining this relationship 
as a group that has sworn fealty to and relies upon support from another group.197 Therefore, the 
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TTP's affiliation with Al-Qaeda could explain why intense drone strikes failed to degrade the 
organization, and the TTP were instead emboldened to increase their attacks against civilians.198 
  
Support for Prior Research 
Hakimullah's appointment as leader of the TTP and the subsequent increase in TTP 
violence observed in the case study supports Abrahms' and Potter's findings that low-level 
militants are more likely than their leaders to target civilians.199 Hakimullah Mehsud had 
previously served under Baitullah Mehsud, but the latter's death elevated Hakimullah Mehsud to 
a leadership position, thus empowering a previously lower-level militant who was less reserved 
than his predecessor in his selection of targets to a leadership position.200 
The case study also supports prior studies of combatant capacity and previous 
understandings of the relationship between combatant capacity and militant violence. According 
to Wood, as a combatant weakens relative to its opponent, it becomes more likely to resort to 
civilian victimization as a means of fulfilling resource needs and policing the population. This 
principle explains TTP violence against civilians, especially TTP killings of alleged spies; as the 
drone campaign intensified in Pakistan, incidents of the TTP killing civilians whom they 
believed to be informing against them increased. This tactic appears to be an attempt to control 
the civilian population, as the TTP frequently left notes warning future informants against such 
behavior with the mutilated bodies of their victims. Wood argues that a stronger militant group 
would rely on incentives to control the population and that resorting to civilian victimization 
indicates a weak organization, which the TTP are compared to the Pakistani and U.S. militaries. 
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The TTP also direct their attacks against targets representing Western interests and the 
Pakistani state, such as NATO operations, Pakistani political leaders and party rallies, and 
Pakistani police and military institutions. The TTP frequently state that these attacks are in 
retaliation for drone strikes and will continue if drone strikes continue. This tactic demonstrates 
how the TTP resort to increased targeting of civilians to make continued strikes more costly and 
provides further support for Wood's findings that combatants are more likely to target civilians 
as they weaken relative to their adversary.201 
Prior studies have been unable to determine whether increases in terrorist violence 
observed after drone strikes and leadership decapitations are due to terrorists' desire for revenge 
or organizational change within the group that occurs due to leadership deficits. Byman argues 
that terrorists retaliate when their leaders are killed, citing examples from the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and Jaeger and Siddique also find evidence of vengeance effects in terrorist groups in 
Pakistan.202 However, Abrahms and Mierau find little evidence of Byman's “vengeance” theory, 
instead attributing the increased violence post-leadership decapitation to change in the terrorist 
organization and the resulting principal-agent problems that follow the death of a leader.203 
Both theories appear to influence TTP violence in the wake of drone strikes. Vengeance 
does seem to partly drive TTP attacks; the quantitative analysis shows that an increase in U.S. 
drone strikes is associated with an increase in the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks. 
Furthermore, TTP attacks increase significantly during the most intense period of drone strikes in 
Pakistan, and TTP propaganda clearly states that many of these attacks are vengeful in nature. 
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Attacks specifically against Western interests increased significantly during 2010, with 
continued suicide attacks against NATO operations and further assassinations and kidnappings 
of Western diplomats, and TTP statements clearly asserted that these attacks were in retaliation 
for drone strikes.204 Attacks also increased during this period against targets representing the 
Pakistani state, including political leaders, government institutions, and military and police 
forces, with the TTP also claiming revenge against Pakistan for its support of U.S. drone strikes 
in the region. However, these attacks do not appear motivated solely by revenge, as they are also 
intended to damage U.S. operations in the region and undermine the Pakistani state's authority. 
However, organizational change seems to have a role in TTP attacks as well. As 
previously discussed, Hakimullah's rise to leader of the TTP and subsequent increase in TTP 
attacks provides an example of Abrahms' and Mierua's principle-agent problem of lower-level 
militants becoming empowered in organizations with leadership deficit problems. There are 
other changes to leadership structure not identified by Abrahms and Mierau that occur in the 
TTP, which may also explain how drone strikes can cause organizational changes that result in 
increased terrorist violence. For example, drone strikes can force rival groups to work together, 
as happened with the TTP and Ahmedzai Wazir tribes.205 In another example of the 
consequences of the leadership deficits created by drone strikes, the strike against Baitullah 
Mehsud enabled the alliance of the TTP and the Haqqani by promoting Hakimullah Mehsud to 
TTP leader. Finally, even failed drone strikes alter leadership structure by providing an 
opportunity for terrorist leaders to capitalize on the failed strike as evidence of the United States' 
weakness and their own strength, reinforcing their position as the organization leader. 
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Contradictions with Prior Research 
There are several findings in the literature that the case study contradicts. First, Jordan's 
studies show that age is one of the strongest predictors of the effectiveness of leadership 
decapitations and that drone strikes are more effective against younger organizations than they 
are against older organizations.206 Yet, the TTP formed at the same time as the drone campaign 
intensified in Pakistan, so according to her findings, drone strikes should have been more 
effective at degrading the TTP than I observed them to be. However, Jordan also found that 
drone strikes were less effective against large and religious organizations, so drone strikes may 
have been less effective against the TTP because it is an agglomerate of over 40 Taliban factions 
and a fundamentalist Islamist group.207 The observed increase in terrorist attacks conducted by 
the TTP despite intense drone strikes suggests that the size and type of the terrorist group may 
play a more substantial role in determining whether the group is susceptible to degradation by 
drone strikes than group age. 
Both Jordan and Byman argue that decentralized groups are harder to eliminate, so the 
high degree of command held by local commanders in the TTP may also explain why drone 
strikes did not degrade the group.208 However, Tominaga identifies institutionalization, or the 
ability of an organization to replace its leaders, as another principal component of resistance to 
degradation.209 Jordan notes that younger organizations have rarely had time to develop this ease 
of succession, yet the TTP did not struggle after Baitullah Mehsud's death and instead quickly 
replaced him with Hakimullah Mehsud.210 This example contradicts Jordan's assumption, yet it is 
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also likely that the TTP could make such a swift transition only because of the assistance of 
Sirajuddin Haqqani, a leader of the well-established Haqqani. 
The observed increase in TTP attacks provides an example that also contradicts Johnston, 
who argues that leadership decapitations reduce the intensity of militant violence and the 
frequency of attacks. The case study demonstrates how the removal of Baitullah Mehsud and the 
appointment of Hakimullah Mehsud as leader of the TTP failed to decrease TTP violence; TTP 
attacks instead increased in frequency, and in many cases, became more lethal in the number of 
people targeted.211 
The violence described in the case study contradicts Abrahms' and Potter's study as well, 
which finds that terrorist attacks increase against “soft” targets but decrease against “hard” 
targets in the wake of drone strikes.212 Yet, the case study shows that, while attacks against 
“soft” targets such as tribespeople, religious leaders, and political institutions increased, attacks 
against “hard” targets increased as well, with attacks against police and military forces starting in 
2010. 
This observed increase in attacks occurring between 2010 and 2011 suggests that 
territorial control does influence militant violence against civilians, contrary to Humphreys and 
Weinstein's rejection of a relationship between territorial control and violence. The majority of 
U.S. drone strikes target the FATA and KPK provinces, where the TTP are based, and the 
quantitative analysis shows that as drone strikes increase, TTP attacks against civilians also tend 
to increase. The case study also shows that TTP violence increased during the most intense 
period of the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan, suggesting that U.S. military action against the 
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TTP base of operations influences TTP violence against civilians. TTP killings of alleged spies 
make the relationship between territorial control and violence more evident; as drone strikes 
against the TTP increased and the TTP became increasingly paranoid about informants providing 
the United States with intelligence that could lead to future drone strikes, they retaliated against 
civilians whom they accused of beings spies. 
On the other hand, failed drone strikes seem to serve as a rallying cry for terrorist leaders, 
as occurred when Hakimullah Mehsud survived a failed drone strike against him.213 Abrahms 
had previously predicted that failed strikes would force terrorists to assume a “diminished 
posture” within the organization; however, this example of TTP leadership suggests that terrorist 
leaders may view failed drone strikes as an opportunity to reinforce their leadership within the 
organization.214 This phenomenon is likely observed in other religious terrorist organizations, 
specifically in fundamentalist Islamist groups. Hakimullah invoked the idea of martyrdom in 
order to emphasize the United States' failure to kill him, saying that “The media sometimes 
propagates about my martyrdom and sometimes claims that the operation in South Waziristan 
has been completed.”215 Other fundamentalist Islamist leaders could allude to the idea of 
martyrdom in this same way and use it as a rallying cry for their followers to reinforce their own 
leadership and encourage hatred of the United States.  
  
Alternative Explanations 
         There are several alternative explanations for the increase in TTP attacks which I observed 
in both the quantitative analysis and the case study. First, TTP violence may be primarily in 
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response to Pakistani military actions. According to the quantitative analysis, government ground 
strikes had the most explanatory power of any of the explanatory variables, with increases in 
government ground strikes accounting for the most variation in the number of civilians killed in 
TTP attacks per day. Militant animosity towards the Pakistani state reached a peak in July 2007 
with the Lal Masjid incident, when Pakistani security forces killed Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Abdul 
Rashid Ghazi in a raid against the “Red Mosque” in Islamabad.216 The perceived martyrdom of 
Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Abdul Rashid Ghazi excited many militants, providing a catalyst for the 
formation of the TTP and a reason to start attacking Pakistani targets along with U.S. and NATO 
forces.217 
         Pakistani military operations into FATA against the TTP intensified in 2009, a year before 
the increase in TTP capacity to conduct more frequent and lethal attacks observed in the case 
study in 2010.218 After previous operations into South Waziristan proved unsuccessful at 
dislodging the TTP, the Pakistani military launched operation Rah-e-Nijat in October 2009, a 
series of offensives into South Waziristan intended to weaken the Mehsud tribe of the TTP.219 
However, the TTP retaliated against the military's operations by increasing suicide bombings in 
KPK, which suggests that military operations against the TTP incite the group to conduct 
revenge attacks and are therefore influential in determining subsequent TTP violence.220 
         It is unlikely that the escalation of violence following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001 sufficiently explains the observed increase in TTP attacks in 2010 and 2011 or the trend of 
TTP attacks increasing relative to U.S. drone strikes. After the United States invaded 
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Afghanistan, Taliban, Arab Al-Qaeda members, and Central Asian fighters fled U.S. 
bombardment in Afghanistan and sought refuge in FATA—since then, terrorist violence has 
remained an issue in Northwestern Pakistan.221 However, militant anger for the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan and continued U.S. military presence in the region does not exist separately from 
militant anger for U.S. drone strikes; rather, U.S. drone strikes are an obvious and representative 
form of U.S. military presence in the region and fuel militant hatred toward the United States. 
The United States conducted drone strikes as early as October 2001 in Afghanistan, so drones 
have remained an integral aspect of militants' perception of U.S. military presence and resultant 
militant violence since the escalation of hostilities in the region began following the fall of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.222 
Another possible explanation for the observed increase in TTP attacks is the conflict 
between the TTP and tribal leadership structure in Northwestern Pakistan. The tribal system is 
the primary system of social organization and the main method of governance in FATA, with 
tribal elders frequently serving as intermediaries between local tribesmen and political agents of 
the Pakistani national government.223 TTP militants have systematically tried to undermine this 
government system, primarily by killing tribal leaders, which both severs the ties between the 
tribal region and the larger Pakistani state and intimidates local tribes who might resist TTP 
rule.224 
         However, it is unlikely that the conflict between the TTP and tribal groups can account for 
all TTP violence. First, the TTP do not direct all of their attacks against tribal interests—a 
considerable number of attacks target Pakistani and western interests or minority groups. Second, 
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violence directed explicitly against tribal interests, such as TTP killings of alleged spies, appears 
motivated by suspicion of the victim's involvement with intelligence agencies and not 
perpetuated solely to undermine tribal authority. Finally, these attacks against spies did not 
increase until several years after drone strikes intensified in tribal regions, despite the existence 
of militant groups in the region years before that period; therefore, it is unlikely that the violence 
is due exclusively to the existing conflict between the TTP and tribal groups, but this power 
struggle certainly plays a role in motivating TTP violence against civilians. 
  
Limitations 
         It is important to note that the quantitative analysis only includes linear regression tests, so 
it can only demonstrate a correlation between the explanatory variables and the response variable 
and show how much of the variation in the response variable can be explained by the explanatory 
variables. A linear regression model cannot demonstrate causation, so the tests included in the 
quantitative analysis do not show that ground strikes or airstrikes cause civilians to die in TTP 
attacks. For this reason, I relied on a case study of the TTP to examine how drone strikes 
influence TTP violence against civilians. 
         The primary limitation in both the quantitative analysis and the case study is the type of 
terrorist organization analyzed, which may affect the results' generalizability. The TTP are a 
younger terrorist organization, formed at the end of 2007, as opposed to older groups such as Al-
Qaeda, formed in 1988.225 The TTP is also a religious group, specifically fundamentalist 
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Islamist, much like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.226 One of the identifying characteristics of 
the TTP is that they are engaged in a “defensive jihad” against the Pakistani state, meaning that 
they directly engage with Pakistani military forces and aim to replace the Pakistani government 
with an Islamic caliphate.227 
         This latter goal distinguishes the TTP from other terrorist groups that might still be similar 
in size and type because not all terrorist groups attack the state in the same way that the TTP do. 
Notable among these groups are the Haqqani and Afghan Taliban, who avoid confrontation with 
Pakistan.228 Therefore, the results of this study may not apply to groups who focus their attacks 
against external states and groups rather than against the central government to overthrow and 
replace it. TTP violence against the Pakistani state comprises a significant portion of the findings 
of this study; a majority of the targets attacked in the observed increase in violence are 
institutions of the Pakistani state, and a primary component of the TTP's anti-Pakistan stance is 
Pakistan's support of U.S. drone strikes. Therefore, the same increase in terrorist attacks against 
civilians may not be observed in a group whose goals are directed outside of the state in which 
they operate. 
         However, there are many similarities between the TTP and other terrorist groups operating 
in Pakistan. Almost all of the militant groups operating in FATA oppose U.S. and NATO forces 
in the region, and many are affiliated with Afghan militant groups that conduct attacks across the 
Pakistani border in Afghanistan against western interests.229 Significant similarities exist 
between Al-Qaeda and the TTP as well; most notably, Al-Qaeda also rejects the legitimacy of 
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the Pakistani government and assists the TTP in carrying out attacks against the Pakistani 
state.230 Because of these similarities, drone strikes would likely have a similar effect on Al-
Qaeda and other militant groups operating in FATA and result in increased terrorist targeting of 
civilians. 
         This study's results may also be generalizable to other religious terrorist organizations 
outside of Pakistan engaged in violence against the state intended to overthrow the central 
government. For example, Al-Shabaab in Somalia aims to gain control of territory and institute 
Shari'a law, and similarly to the TTP, it conducts attacks against the Somali government and the 
western countries supporting it.231 The Islamic State (IS) also engages in attacks against the Iraqi 
and Syrian government to establish an Islamic caliphate, much like the TTP aim to do in 
Pakistan.232 The results of the study are likely applicable to these two groups specifically, as they 
are both large, fundamentalist Islamist groups like the TTP.233 However, IS is older, formed in 
1999, and is not an affiliate group itself; so, drone strikes may not have the same empowering 
effects on the organization that Jordan predicts of affiliate groups and that the case study 
demonstrates occurs in young, affiliate organizations.234 On the other hand, Al-Shabaab is almost 
the same age as the TTP, formed in 2006, and it is an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, as are the TTP—
because of these significant similarities between the groups, the results of the study could be 
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VI. Conclusion 
         Including failed strikes and strikes against low-level militants in analysis of how drone 
strikes influence the frequency, lethality, and ways in which terrorists attack civilians is critical 
to evaluating the efficacy of the U.S. drone campaign as a whole. Focusing only on drone strikes 
that successfully eliminate terrorist leaders fails to account for the effects of the majority of U.S. 
drone strikes, which either fail to kill their intended target, purposefully target unknown 
militants, or are intended to eliminate low-level militants specifically. By including these strikes 
in the dataset of the quantitative analysis and conducting a case study to explore how general 
drone strikes influence Tehrik-i Taliban (TTP) violence, this study begins to assess the entire 




         The results of this study raise several questions which future studies should explore. The 
quantitative analysis shows a correlation between the number of U.S. drone strikes conducted in 
the 30 days prior to a specific date and the number of civilians who died in TTP attacks on that 
same date. However, the quantitative analysis shows the government ground strikes predict more 
of the variation in the number of civilian deaths in TTP attacks per day than either government or 
U.S. airstrikes, so future research should conduct a quantitative analysis that focuses on this 
variable. Questions to consider include: do ground strikes conducted by different groups in 
Pakistan affect TTP violence differently, such as the Pakistani military versus paramilitary 
groups like the Khasadar tribal militia? Are ground strikes associated with the same increase in 
TTP attacks in each district in FATA and KPK, or do districts such as North and South 
Waziristan witness more violence with each additional government ground strike because of the 
frequency of TTP attacks in these areas? Do different types of government ground strikes, such 
as armed clashes, government acquisition of territory, and shelling, artillery, and missile attacks 
have different impacts on subsequent TTP violence? 
         Future research should also consider examining whether the trends identified in this study 
apply to terrorist organizations with different characteristics than the TTP, such as separatist or 
ideological groups, or groups such as the Haqqani and Afghan Taliban, which purposefully avoid 
conflict with the central government and direct their attacks externally. 
         Finally, this study discusses a specific form of violence employed by the TTP, killing 
alleged spies, which appears intimately related to drone strikes. The TTP fear drone strikes and 
therefore retaliate against civilians by killing anyone suspected of providing the United States 
with information that could lead to future strikes. Future research should trace the origins of this 
paranoia and explain why and how it arose so suddenly and forcefully in the TTP. Future 
research should also investigate whether this specific tactic of violence exists in other terrorist 
and insurgent groups and the role of U.S. drone strikes in the persistence of this tactic. 
  
Policy Implications 
         Policymakers have previously assumed that drone strikes were instrumental in degrading 
the TTP; however, the case study demonstrates that TTP capacity to conduct attacks increased 
during periods of intense drone strikes. These findings contradict prior assumptions about the 
efficacy of drone strikes at destabilizing terrorist organizations and suggest that future military 
operations should question whether drone strikes have this assumed degradation effect. It is 
possible that drone strikes are counterproductive against young groups that are still large and 
religious, such as the TTP. One of the multiple linear regression models shows that a 10% 
increase in drone strikes predicts a 2.5% increase in civilian deaths; according to the range of 
daily civilian deaths observed in the data, a 2.5% increase in deaths can mean anywhere from 0 
to 6 additional people killed in TTP attacks per day with an average of about 19 people killed in 
per day. Policymakers should consider the potential these attacks have to destabilize the 
Pakistani government—both because the attacks themselves often target Pakistani institutions 
directly and because civilian casualties emphasize the inability of the Pakistani government to 
protect its citizens from terrorist threats, which Wood notes decreases civilians' ability to resist 
attacks.236 Because the United States relies on Pakistan to counter militants in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces, policymakers 
should be aware of the possible implications of increasing drone strikes for destabilizing the 
current government in Pakistan. 
         The quantitative analysis also shows that the number of civilians killed in TTP attacks 
increases as the number of government ground strikes conducted over the previous 30 days 
increases and that government ground strikes account for more of the variation in civilian deaths 
than U.S. airstrikes. This finding suggests that policymakers should weigh the potential benefits 
that ongoing NATO and U.S. military operations on the ground in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
region have for the destabilization of the TTP against the likelihood that civilian casualties will 
increase if the United States intensifies these operations. Similarly, the United States should 
evaluate its support for Pakistan's military operations in the context of increasing civilian deaths 
and determine whether ground strikes are an effective method of degrading the TTP and other 
terrorist organizations in the region. 
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         Policymakers should also consider how drone strikes will impact terrorist and insurgent 
groups with similar characteristics and group goals as the TTP, such as Al-Shabaab and IS. Al-
Shabaab aims to control territory and establish Shari'a law, similar to the TTP's “defensive jihad” 
against the Pakistani government.237 The United States conducts drone strikes against Somalia, 
where Al-Shabaab is located, so these strikes are likely influencing Al-Shabaab attacks against 
Somali civilians similarly to the observed trends in TTP violence in Pakistan. In Iraq and Syria, 
IS aims to overthrow the established governments and create an Islamic caliphate, similar to the 
TTP's goals of establishing an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan. IS previously fought against various 
military forces, including Syrian and Iraqi military and militia groups, but began transitioning to 
a decentralized, guerilla-style insurgency in 2019.238 According to the quantitative analysis, 
government ground strikes over the previous 30 days predict approximately 6% of the variation 
in civilian deaths per day; considering the likelihood that military forces on the ground will 
continue to clash with the IS insurgency, civilian deaths can be expected to increase as well. 
Therefore, the United States should take this relationship into account in its future involvement 
in Syria and against IS. 
         The threat of terrorism no longer dominates national security policy in the way that it did 
two decades ago, but as the “War on Terror” continues, national security policy has shifted 
towards drone strikes as the favored method for eliminating terrorists while minimizing U.S. 
troop commitment. However, this study demonstrates that the drone campaign in its entirety may 
drive terrorist violence, exacerbating rather than diminishing attacks against civilians. 
Policymakers should reevaluate the use of signature strikes against low-level militants and think 
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critically about the consequences for civilians and the potential for further destabilization before 
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